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Abstract 
 Maritime piracy varies from place to place and from age to age. This thesis aims to explain 
the variation of piracy across time and space by exploring the capability of establishing maritime 
governance against piracy. The spatial variation in the number of piratical attacks is explained by 
calculating the state capacity for governing the surrounding seas called Sea Power Index. The 
thesis argues that pirates particularly target waters near a state with “medium” levels of sea power 
because such states are not capable of enforcing strict regulations on piracy but can provide enough 
infrastructure and economy for pirates to have a profitable “business.” The variation in the 
frequency of piratical attacks across time is determined by the capability of the hegemonic powers 
in that time period. The dynamics of the prosperity and downfall of pirates are examined through 
a comparative case study. The main advantage in adopting the arguments above is that the thesis 
covers a gap in the literature by incorporating state-level maritime governance and international 
maritime governance to understand both spatial and temporal variations of piracy. 
  
Ishikawa iii 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Illustrations .................................................................................................................... v 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2 Literature Review .................................................................................................... 5 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5 
Economic Cost-Benefit Calculations ........................................................................................ 6 
Political Cost-Benefit Calculations .......................................................................................... 9 
Capability for Establishing Governance as an Explanatory Variable ...................................... 12 
Temporal Variation of Piracy ................................................................................................. 14 
Chapter 3 Theory and Methods.............................................................................................. 16 
Theory ................................................................................................................................... 16 
Introduction: Governance ................................................................................................... 16 
State-Level Maritime Governance: Sea Power ................................................................... 17 
International Maritime Governance: Hegemony ................................................................. 22 
Methods................................................................................................................................. 27 
Dependent Variable ........................................................................................................... 27 
Independent Variables ........................................................................................................ 29 
Case Studies....................................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 4 Numerical Analysis ................................................................................................ 33 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 33 
Results ................................................................................................................................... 34 
Overall Trend ..................................................................................................................... 39 
Trend by Time ................................................................................................................... 40 
Trend by Region ................................................................................................................ 42 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 45 
Chapter 5 Case Studies ........................................................................................................... 47 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 47 
General History of Piracy ...................................................................................................... 49 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 49 
The Ancient Mediterranean: The Third to First Centuries BCE .......................................... 50 
Ishikawa iv 
 
Northern Europe: The Ninth to Fourteenth Centuries ......................................................... 51 
The Caribbean Sea: The Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries ................................................. 53 
The Barbary Coast: The Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries ................................................ 54 
Northeast Asia: The Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries ..................................................... 55 
Case 1: The Ancient Mediterranean ....................................................................................... 57 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 57 
The Roman Republic’s Steps to the Hegemony .................................................................. 58 
Suppression of Piracy by Pompey the Great ....................................................................... 60 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 62 
Case 2: The Barbary Coast..................................................................................................... 63 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 63 
The Hegemonic Competition between the Ottoman Empire and Spain ............................... 64 
The Hegemonic Competition among European States ........................................................ 66 
Suppression of Piracy by European States .......................................................................... 67 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 70 
Case 3: Northeast Asia ........................................................................................................... 71 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 71 
The First Wave of Wakō: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries ...................................... 73 
The Second Wave of Wakō: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries ............................... 76 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 80 
Chapter 6 Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 81 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 85 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 94 
 
  
Ishikawa v 
 
List of Illustrations 
Figures 
Figure 4.1 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 ...................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 4.2 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2001 ...................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 4.3 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 2002 and 2008 ...................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 4.4 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 2009 and 2015 ...................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 4.5 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 31 states in Africa ................................................................... 43 
Figure 4.6 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 25 states in Europe .................................................................. 43 
Figure 4.7 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 19 states in the Middle East ..................................................... 44 
Figure 4.8 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 23 states in Asia-Pacific .......................................................... 44 
Figure 4.9 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 23 states in the Americas ......................................................... 45 
 
 
Tables 
Table 4.1 Number of Piracy Incidents Reported to the IMB ...................................................... 35 
Table 4.2 Sea Power Index ........................................................................................................ 37 
Table 5.1 Overview of the International Systems under Each Piracy Case ................................. 47 
Table A.1 Summary of Each Component (1), 1995-2015 .......................................................... 94 
Table A.2 Summary of Each Component (2), 1995-2001, 2002-2008, 2009-2015 ..................... 98 
Table A.3 Geographic Characteristics ..................................................................................... 102 
Table A.4 Government Quality: Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness .......................... 106 
Table A.5 Military Capacity (1): Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP ............................... 110 
Table A.6 Military Capacity (2): Total Tonnage of Naval Ships  ............................................ 114 
Table A.7 Economy (1): GDP per Capita ................................................................................ 118 
Table A.8 Economy (2): Total Merchandise Trade (Exports and Imports Combined) .............. 122 
Ishikawa vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
 It was a long way to get here since I decided to write a thesis in the spring of 2017. 
However, I was fortunate enough to receive support from many people. I would like to take this 
opportunity to express my profound gratitude for their encouragement, inspiration, and support. 
 First, I would like to thank my honors advisor, Professor Tun-Jen Cheng. He spent number 
of hours for me to help organizing and sharpening my thinking throughout the academic year. It 
was impossible for me to complete this extremely challenging work without his valuable guidance 
and encouragement. 
 Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Professor 
Hiroshi Kitamura and Professor Dennis Smith. Their classes in my Sophomore year motivated me 
to pursue the study in International Relations. They continuously gave me valuable insights and 
helpful feedback. 
 I also thank Chad Amos, my Freshman hall roommate, for his continuous encouragement. 
He always cheered me when we had the “weekly dinner” together. He also offered me tips on 
presenting materials effectively all the time. 
 Finally, I thank Mariko and Toshiki Ishikawa, my parents, for providing me a wonderful 
opportunity to spend my four years of university in the United States, and specifically at William 
and Mary. Their support was necessary to accomplish this challenge. 
  
Ishikawa 1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
“[N]am pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium; 
cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse commune.”1 
 “For a pirate is not counted as an enemy proper, but is the common foe of all. There 
ought to be no faith with him, nor the sharing of any sworn oaths.”2 
Cicero, On Duties. 
 Maritime piracy (hereafter, piracy) has been described as hostis humani generis, or the 
“enemy of all mankind” since the time of Cicero in the late Republic Rome. Calling pirates as the 
common enemy of all, Cicero emphasized their inhumane nature as outsiders of the law.3 For the 
Roman Republic, disruptions of navigation within its vast territories were a true threat. The 
maritime trade between colonies throughout the Mediterranean was the foundation of the 
republic’s economic prosperity.4 The Roman Republic is not the only victim of pirates. Even in 
small numbers, piracy can significantly impact national security for many polities. 5 Cicero’s 
criticism of pirates as hostis humani generis has been shared by people in power for most of history. 
 Although often seen as a historical relic, piracy is a major international security issue even 
in the twenty-first century. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Article 100, piracy is officially recognized as an international crime that all states have 
a duty to collectively suppress.6 Furthermore, UNCLOS provides the official legal definition of 
                                                   
1 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, trans. Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library 30. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1913), 384. 
2 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Duties, ed. Miriam T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 141. 
3 Thomas K Heebøll-Holm, Ports, Piracy, and Maritime War: Piracy in the English Channel and the Atlantic, c. 
1280 - c. 1330 (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2013), 2. 
4 D. R. Burgess, The World for Ransom: Piracy is Terrorism, Terrorism is Piracy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 
2010), 31. 
5 Ibid., 30. 
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 12 October 1982, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 1833, No.31363, p.3 
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piracy in Article 101: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State.7 
Because it is an international law, UNCLOS does not mention piracy within a state’s territorial sea. 
Instead, acts of piracy inside the jurisdiction of a sovereign state are distinguished as “armed 
robberies against ships.”8 However, piratical activities within a territorial sea and on the high seas 
must be considered together as shared threats to the international community because both areas 
have been used for international trade. Contemporary piracy increases economic costs and 
uncertainty of international trade by targeting ships passing through “choke points” like the Gulf 
of Aden off Somalia or the Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia. The international community has 
begun implementing counter-piracy policies in response to current piracy incidents. The United 
Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1816, authorizing states to use their naval forces to 
protect ships inside the territorial sea of Somalia in 2008.9 Still, the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) has recorded 2,065 actual and attempted piracy and armed robbery attacks world-wide 
between 2008 to 2015.10 Although multinational cooperation for counter-piracy has prevented a 
                                                   
7 Ibid. 
8 International Maritime Organization, “Resolution A.1025(26) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” (December 2, 2009). 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc_id=13817&filename=A%201025%2826%29.pdf. 
9 UN Security Council, “Resolution 1816, S/RES/1816” (June 2, 2008). http://undocs.org/S/RES/1816(2008). 
10 ICC International Maritime Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships-- 2016 Annual Report 
(London: ICC IMB, 2017), 5. 
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further increase in the number of attacks, modern piracy does not seem to be diminished. 
 Piracy varies from place to place and from age to age. This thesis aims to identify and 
explain the variation of piracy across time and space. Recent research on piracy has dealt with how 
the number of incidents is influenced by the capability of each coastal state in establishing 
governance. With more extensive governance, the possibility of pirates being captured by a 
government authority increases. People would choose other options when piratical activities are 
costly and less attractive under sufficient governance of a state. However, much of the literature is 
limited to measuring government’s capability to enforce power within the territory. Instead, the 
levels of governance must incorporate a state’s capability to project power not only on land but 
also towards the surrounding seas, or the state-level maritime governance. 
 Looking at the history of piracy, there were certain periods when pirates prospered, while 
they disappeared in other time periods. Regional instability typically rises when great powers are 
competing for dominance. Under such conditions, the number of piracy incidents increases. 
Meanwhile, regional conflicts are reduced when a hegemonic actor, either a single or a collection 
of states, establishes stable maritime governance in the region. Maritime powers have 
accomplished regional stability by instituting international maritime governance of the period. 
 In this thesis, I will explore the capability of establishing maritime governance against 
piracy. Each state has a different capability of governing the surrounding seas, and such 
competence is reflected on the maritime governance of a state. The spatial variation in the number 
of piratical attacks is determined by the capability of establishing maritime governance, or the “sea 
Ishikawa 4 
 
power” of a state. Pirates particularly target waters near a state with “medium” levels of sea power 
because such states are not capable of enforcing strict regulations on piracy but can provide enough 
infrastructure and economy for pirates to have a profitable “business.” The variation in the 
frequency of piratical attacks across time is determined by the capability of the hegemonic power 
in that time period. During times when hegemony was resolved to establish stable international 
maritime governance, pirates were brought to ruin from the region. The main advantage in 
adopting the arguments above is that the thesis covers a gap in the literature by incorporating state-
level maritime governance and international maritime governance to understand both spatial and 
temporal variations of piracy. 
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, the literature on the causes of piracy 
is reviewed. In Chapter 3, I present my theory of sea power as a measurement of state’s capability 
of establishing maritime governance and outline the methodology used in obtaining and analyzing 
the data on piracy and sea power. The chapter also introduces the causal mechanisms that connect 
the rise and fall of pirates with the collapse and emergence of hegemonic powers. The connection 
between the number of piracy incidents and sea power of each state is analyzed through the 
numerical analysis in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I survey the development and the elimination of 
major pirates in history to reveal how a hegemonic power of the time contributed to the growth 
and the decline of piracy. The conclusion is found in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Introduction 
The study of piracy in the field of international relations did not fully expand until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century.11 Among different studies on contemporary piracy, some 
scholars focus on the lessons from historical cases, while other scholars analyze potential policy 
outcomes for international anti-piracy regime.12 Since my research focuses on factors that affect 
spatial and temporal variations of piratical attacks, I review the existing literature on causes of 
piracy. 
There is a variety of literature that studies the reasons for piracy, but a common argument 
is that people decide to become pirates based on cost-benefit considerations. In other words, people 
join piratical groups if expected benefits of joining the group exceed expected costs. This argument 
is based on an assumption that individuals make decisions rationally. For example, using historical 
records from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Leeson shows that “pirates’ behavior has a 
rational choice explanation at its foundation.” 13  Even for contemporary piracy, individuals 
rationally decide to join piratical organizations if they see piracy as a more beneficial activity than 
                                                   
11 For a general overview of the existing studies on maritime piracy, see Shannon Lee Dawdy, “Why Pirates Are 
Back,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 7, no. 1 (August 2011): 361-385. 
12 J. L. Anderson, “Piracy and World History: An Economic Perspective on Maritime Predation,” Journal of World 
History 6, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 175-199. gives us a great insight on different economic motivations that pirates 
historically had; Anja Shortland, and Sarah Percy, “Governance, Naval Intervention and Piracy in Somalia,” Peace 
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 19, no. 2 (2013): 275-283. assesses the effectiveness of international 
naval missions in the Gulf of Aden. 
13 Peter T Leeson, “Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices,” Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 76, no. 3 (September 2010): 497-510. Leeson argues that pirates minimized cost of fighting and 
maximized the gain from attack by applying the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building; Peter T 
Leeson, “An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization,” Journal of Political Economy 115, no. 6 
(December 2007): 1049-1094. In his other article, Leeson also describes pirates in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries sought efficiency in the internal governance so that pirates can maximize their gains. 
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others. 
There are two aspects in cost-benefit calculations. One group points out the expected 
income as a key factor to determine people’s choice between legal and illegal jobs. If an expected 
return is low in lawful employment, then people would choose to get involved in criminal activities 
like piracy. Another group emphasizes the probability of being captured and punished by an 
authority as the fundamental cost of piratical acts. People engage in piracy if they expect an 
authority to have low capacity to patrol the surrounding seas and punish criminals. I argue that a 
lack of state capability for maritime governance diminishes the costs of becoming pirates in both 
ways. Thus, the cost-benefit calculation must include both economic and political aspects to 
understand the causes of piracy. 
 
Economic Cost-Benefit Calculations 
The first group of literature identifies the economic situation of a state as the primary 
factor that influences the cost-benefit calculations of becoming pirates. If states are not capable of 
providing a sufficient economy that makes people think of piracy as a less beneficial and attractive 
choice, then people decide to join piratical groups. 
The basis of this theory comes from an application of economic theory to criminal and 
terrorism studies. The classic model was established by Gary Becker. He argues that “a person 
commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time 
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and other resources at other activities.”14 In this situation, a criminal sector is simply considered 
as one of many sectors that an individual can potentially work in. Depending on the economic 
situation, workers choose the crime sector if wage in return to criminal activities is higher than in 
other sectors.15 In other words, crime rate in a society increases when the opportunity cost of 
joining the criminal sector is low, because the perceived wage in legal sectors is low. Thus, Becker 
establishes a theory that the opportunity cost determines the individual’s choice to commit a crime. 
Empirical research has shown that the opportunity cost of joining a criminal group 
depends on the economic situation of individuals. Among different indicators of economic 
condition, poverty and unemployment make the opportunity cost of participation especially low. 
Fearon and Laitin note that per capita income is a better indicator to predict the rise of insurgency 
than ethnic or religious diversities.16 Kavanagh argues that poverty encourages recruitment of 
terrorist groups for highly educated individuals.17 According to Kavanagh, “the lack of market 
options reduces the opportunity costs of group participation for highly educated individuals” in 
poor economic situation.18 This study amplifies the strong correlation between the opportunity 
cost and the individual’s decision of joining a criminal organization. 
A similar framework has been applied to the study of piracy as well. Unfavorable 
                                                   
14 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 76, no. 2 
(March & April 1968): 176. 
15 Ibid. 
16 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 
97, no. 01 (February 2003): 88. 
17 Jennifer Kavanagh, “Selection, Availability, and Opportunity: The Conditional Effect of Poverty on Terrorist 
Group Participation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 1 (February 2010): 106. 
18 Ibid., 110. Kavanagh notes that the opportunity cost for less educated individuals is constant for any economic 
situations. Matched up with high demand of highly educated individuals by terrorist groups, their expected return 
from participating terrorist organizations becomes especially high under a weak economic situation. 
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economic environments reduce the opportunity cost of getting involved in piracy. Hallwood and 
Miceli argue that “a Somali person chooses to become a pirate when the perceived benefit of doing 
so is larger than the expected cost incurred in engaging in the dangerous job of piracy,” and in fact 
“the expected financial return to piracy in Somali[a] is so high.”19 Murphy also notes that piracy 
is “a low-risk, criminal activity that pays well” in Somalia.20 These studies show that the cost-
benefit analysis favors a choice of becoming a pirate when the expected gain from legitimate 
sectors is so low in some states like Somalia.21 
Some empirical studies have demonstrated that criminal activities, both on land and at 
sea, are considered as alternative ways to earn profits when the expected income from other sectors 
is not favorable. Because many pirates are recruited from the fishery sector, Daxecker and Prins 
show the relationship between fisheries production values and the number of piracy incidents.22 
Fluckiger and Ludwig demonstrate “the existence of a negative association between plankton 
abundance and piratical attacks.”23 Individuals choose to become pirates when not only fish prices, 
but also other commodity prices are low, and expected earnings from piratical activities are high.24 
                                                   
19 C. Paul Hallwood, and Thomas J. Miceli, Maritime Piracy and Its Control: An Economic Analysis (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 23-28. 
20 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge of Piracy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 24. 
21 For more examples on how the economic and ecological environments in Somalia have induced piratical 
activities, see Jade Lindley. Somali Piracy: A Criminological Perspective (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2016), 32-37. 
22 Ursula E. Daxecker, and Brandon C. Prins, “Insurgents of the Sea: Institutional and Economic Opportunities for 
Maritime Piracy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 6 (August 2012): 945-946. They argue that the loss of 
economic opportunities in fishery sector incentivize fishermen to join piracy groups. The opportunity cost of not 
becoming a pirate is therefore high, because they would otherwise get worse off if stayed in fishery sector. 
23 Matthias Fluckiger, and Markus Ludwig, “Economic shocks in the fisheries sector and maritime piracy,” Journal 
of Development Economics 114 (January 2015): 118. 
24 Alexander Knorr, “Economic Factors for Piracy: The Effect of Commodity Price Shocks,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 38, no. 8 (April 2015): 671-689. Knorr investigated the effects of commodity prices of agricultural labor-
intensive products on piracy attacks. 
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Another alternative sector that may have bearings on piracy is agriculture. Dube and Vargas reveal 
separate effects of agricultural commodities and natural resources to the armed groups in 
Columbia.25 They argued the fall in agricultural commodity price “reduces the wages and work 
hours of rural workers,” and thus “violence rises as income shocks lower the opportunity cost of 
joining armed groups.” 26  Similarly, Jablonski and Oliver point out that “labor-intensive 
commodity prices (rice and sugar) have a negative effect on piracy.” 27  They conclude that 
commodity pricing influences employment and expected economic gain in the agriculture sector 
and ultimately affects people’s cost-benefit calculations to join piratical groups.28 These studies 
show that the individual choice of participating in piratical activities is based on calculating 
potential benefits that people may receive by participation in such activities. 
 
Political Cost-Benefit Calculations 
 The second group of literature identifies the political situation of a state as the primary 
factor that influences the cost-benefit calculation of becoming pirates. The political cost for pirates 
is the cost of being captured and punished by a government authority. If states are not capable of 
providing sufficient patrols and punishments to convince people that piracy is a costly choice, 
people consider piratical acts cost-effective. Therefore, they argue that a state may experience 
                                                   
25 Oeindrila Dube, and Juan F. Vargas, “Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia,” 
Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 4 (October 2013): 1384-1421. 
26 Ibid., 1413 
27 Jablonski, Ryan S., and Steven Oliver, “The Political Economy of Plunder: Economic Opportunity and Modern 
Piracy,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 4 (August 2012): 695. 
28 Ibid. 
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piracy incidents at a higher rate and at a closer distance to the central authority if the state has low 
capability of establishing maritime governance. 
 Many empirical studies reveal a strong correlation between state capacity and frequency 
of piratical attacks. Pirates choose to raid on vessels off the coast of particular states because they 
consider that the expected cost of piratical acts is low near those states.29 Indeed, Marchione and 
Johnson observe that “pirate attacks appear to cluster in space,” indicating certain coastal regions 
near weak states are particularly more attractive to pirates, and thus repeatedly targeted. 30 
Daxecker and Prins empirically show that “state weakness provides an environment that allows 
piratical groups to flourish as it reduces the capacity of states to combat piracy.”31 As Murphy 
defines weak states as “those that in varying degrees lack the capacity or will to secure the lives 
and property of their inhabitants from internal or external predation,” the previous research focuses 
on the ability of the government to prevent piracy.32 
 Domestic political structures and dynamics usually determine how well a state can 
enforce its governmental order over the surrounding seas. Daxecker and Prins argue that piratical 
activities increase around elections, because electoral competition threatens to disrupt the existing 
collusion between local politicians and pirates.33 In addition to the effectiveness of state-level 
                                                   
29 Radillah Khaerany, and Maskun, “Global Cooperation in Combating Sea Piracy: The Factors behind Global 
Piracy Trends,” Hasanuddin Law Review 2, no. 2 (August 2016): 213-224. Khaerany and Maskun argue that the 
emergence of piracy in Africa and Southeast Asia is due to the state’s weakness and inability to act strongly against 
piracy. 
30 Elio Marchione, and Shane D. Johnson, “Spatial, Temporal and Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Maritime Piracy,” 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 50, no. 4 (2013): 504, 506. 
31 Daxecker and Prins, “Insurgents of the Sea,” 960. 
32 Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 2 
33 Ursula E. Daxecker, and Brandon C. Prins, “The politicization of crime: electoral competition and the supply of 
maritime piracy in Indonesia,” Public Choice 169, no. 3-4 (October 2016): 376-377. 
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governance, Gaibulloev and Sandler argue that extensive provincial-level governance can deter 
piracy.34 By looking at fiscal and political decentralizations as institutional characteristics of a 
state, they show that “enhanced institutional quality limits piracy at both state and regional 
levels.”35 Thus, these studies emphasize that the state capacity influences the pirates’ perceived 
probability of being captured and punished. 
 In addition, some scholars indicate that geographic distance from the power center, like 
capital city, reduces the cost of a piratical act. Using a concept of the loss-of-strength gradient, or 
LSG, Kenneth Boulding notes that “each nation’s strength declines as it moves away from its home 
base.”36 Due to the diminishing power of a government, projecting military and political power to 
ensure the regional stability becomes more difficult in remote regions.37 Weak governments have 
steeper LSG to start with, so the lack of state capacity encourages even more criminal activities 
because they cannot enforce the law.38 Buhaug empirically shows that “civil wars in general locate 
further away from the capital in more powerful regimes” using the concept of LSG.39 Daxecker 
and Prins apply the concept of LSG to their studies of piracy and argue that “increases in state 
strength are associated with greater capital-piracy distances.”40 In another article, they point out 
that “the effect of state capacity on piracy is a function of states’ ability to extend authority over 
                                                   
34 Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, “Decentralization, institutions, and maritime piracy,” Public Choice 169, 
no. 3-4 (June 2016): 358. 
35 Ibid., 357. 
36 Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 230. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 245. 
39 Halvard Buhaug, “Dude, Where’s My Conflict? LSG, Relative Strength, and the Location of Civil War,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 27, no. 2 (April 2010): 107. 
40 Ursula E. Daxecker, and Brandon C. Prins, “Searching for Sanctuary: Government Power and the Location of 
Maritime Piracy,” International Interactions 41, no. 4 (August 2015): 700. In this article, they investigated the 
relationship between distance from capital city to piracy incidents and state capacity. 
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the country’s entire territory.”41 These empirical studies show that the state’s ability to project 
power over long distances is an important component of the cost-benefit consideration for pirates. 
 
Capability for Establishing Governance as an Explanatory Variable 
 A state observes less piracy incidents if it has ability to increase costs of piratical acts. As 
discussed in the above sections, the opportunity costs that pirates face are the expected income 
people could earn from legitimate job and the punishment an authority puts to piratical acts. 
Because these costs are associated with economic and political factors, the ability of a state to 
increase costs and reduce profits of plunder depends on state’s capability of establishing 
governance. States with high capacity can enforce sufficient economic policies to provide lawful 
employments with attractive income. Such state is also capable of organizing an extensive police 
force to inspect and punish illegal acts effectively. Thus, most literature has identified state’s 
capability of establishing governance as an explanatory variable for the spatial variation of piracy. 
 Some scholars show that moderately stable governments hold the most suitable 
environment for pirates and thus observe the largest number of piracy incidence. Arguing piracy 
as a business, Percy and Shortland suggest the inverted U-shaped hypothesis, which argues that 
“on a continuum between highly unstable and very stable there is a large ‘sweet spot’ where piracy 
                                                   
41 Ursula E. Daxecker, and Brandon C. Prins, “Enforcing order: Territorial reach and maritime piracy,” Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 34, no. 4 (2017): 359. They argue that an increase in the number of piratical attacks 
is due to both distance from capital city to coastline and the state’s capability of governance. Their study adds on to 
the previous one by making geographic distance an explanatory variable and including the variation of the number 
of piratical attacks. 
Ishikawa 13 
 
can flourish.”42 They note that even pirates need some sort of stable “business environment” so 
that they can collect ransom and sell captured ships in black market. 43  Hastings clearly 
distinguishes types of piratical attacks in failed states and weak states.44 Weak states have a 
favorable environment for more sophisticated hijackings than failed states because pirates “take 
full advantage of the complex transportation and communication infrastructure, and the large 
commodities markets the region affords” when they try to sell seized ships for profit.45 These 
studies argue that there is no linear relationship between the state capacity and the number of 
piratical attacks; rather, they argue that the relationship is “hump-shaped.” This argument is likely 
to be supported with an assumption that legal enforcement is not improving along with the increase 
in state’s capability of governance from low to medium levels.46 De Groot, Rablen, and Shortland 
argue that state capacity can be improved without legal enforcement by distinguishing “formal 
governance” and “informal (non-governmental) governance.”47 
 Previous research has used a variety of ways to quantify state’s capability of establishing 
governance. For example, Hendrix argues bureaucratic quality and revenue-generating capacity 
                                                   
42 Sarah Percy, and Anja Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 
(August 2013): 552. 
43 Ibid., 553. 
44 Justin V. Hastings, “Geographies of state failure and sophistication in maritime piracy hijackings,” Political 
Geography 28, no. 4 (2009): 213. 
45 Ibid., 220. 
46 Anja Shortland, and Marc Vothknecht, “Combating “maritime terrorism” off the coast of Somalia,” European 
Journal of Political Economy 27 (April 2011): 133-151. In many cases, navies take “catch and release policy” to 
pirates due to unclear international jurisdiction over pirates and a fear of violating human rights of pirates. 
47 Olaf J. de Groot, Matthew D. Rablen, and Anja Shortland, “Gov-aargh-nance— “even criminals need law and 
order,”” IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc. Centre for Economic Development and Institutions, Brunel 
University, Middlesex, UK, 2011. Because criminal groups or other non-governmental actors sometimes have ability 
to create public goods for the community, piracy activities can be more intense in such optimal business 
environment. 
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are the most important indicators to measure state capacity.48 Daxecker and Prins use state fragility 
index from the Center for Systemic Peace in “Insurgents of the Sea,” while they use the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank in their other works.49 De Groot, Rablen, and Shortland 
also use the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 50  Indicators like the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators are, however, limited in terms of measuring the levels of governance because they do 
not include water-specific factors. Governance on land does not account for all aspects of power 
projection. Therefore, the considerations of how effectively states govern the territory and the 
surrounding seas must include additional components to measure “maritime” governance of each 
state. 
 
Temporal Variation of Piracy 
 Previous research that investigated the temporal variation is scarce. Rather, the existing 
literature has primarily focused on explaining the spatial variation of contemporary piracy by 
studying reasons of observing piracy incidents near specific states. However, understanding the 
causal mechanisms of the prosperity and downfall of pirates is necessary to grasp the overall 
relationship between piracy and capability for establishing maritime governance. 
 Because there are many examples of piracy in history, one critical way of formulating a 
generalizable pattern of plundering is by learning the history of piracy. Classifying historical 
                                                   
48 Cullen S. Hendrix, “Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil 
conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (May 2010): 273-285. 
49 Daxecker and Prins, “Searching for Sanctuary,” 706; Daxecker and Prins, “Enforcing order,” 364 
50 De Groot, Rablen, and Shortland, “Gov-aargh-nance,” 13. 
Ishikawa 15 
 
pirates into three categories, Anderson notes that insights from historical cases are “the reflections 
of wider contexts of commerce and politics, and often of remote events and policies formulated 
far from the scene of a particular action.”51 History provides a laboratory to examine different 
outcomes that were caused in different cases. 
 Some scholars have constructed the relationship between the frequency of piracy 
incidents and the fluctuation in capability of establishing governance by investigating historical 
cases. Puchala generalized the temporal variation of piracy as “a wave-like or cyclical 
phenomenon usually beginning with spates of sporadic, small-scale attacks on vulnerable ships in 
especially dangerous waters.”52 He then emphasizes the necessity of using force to eliminate 
pirates by noting “pirate-hunting navies are formed and dispatched, pirate organizations are 
smashed, strongholds are assaulted and reduced and leaders are apprehended or killed.” 53 
Although lessons from history are discussed in these studies, state capacity is not handled as the 
explanatory variable of temporal variation. Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill such gap in the 
literature by examining how capability of establishing governance influences the intensity of 
piratical activities in history.  
                                                   
51 Anderson, “Piracy and World History,” 175-176. The three types of pirates that Anderson classifies are (1) 
parasitic (which is dependent on the extent of seaborne trade or the wealth of vulnerable littorals), (2) episodic 
(which is occasioned by a disruption or distortion of normal trading patterns), and (3) intrinsic (which is a situation 
in which piracy is part of the fiscal and even commercial fabric of the society). 
52 Donald J. Puchala, “Of Pirates and Terrorists: What Experience and History Teach,” Contemporary Security 
Policy 26, no. 1 (April 2005): 1. 
53 Ibid., 2. 
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Chapter 3 Theory and Methods 
Theory 
Introduction: Governance 
The central argument of this thesis is that the capability of establishing maritime 
governance at both state and international levels determines the development of piracy. In this 
chapter, I use the concept of “sea power” to develop the understanding of state-level maritime 
governance and the spatial variation of piratical activities. Then I use the concept of hegemonic 
stability theory to outline how the formation of hegemony affects the temporal variation of such 
activities. 
To begin with, the theoretical concept of “governance” helps to specify the types of 
interactions between states, the international community, and pirates that the thesis focuses on. 
Broadly, Bevir defines governance as “all processes of governing… whether through laws, norms, 
power, or language.”54 Governance thus refers to a procedure to achieve a political outcome, 
although governance is not specifically limited to the government of a state.55 Because governance 
is always associated with an outcome, the policy planning and the policy implementing abilities 
can be good criteria in assessing the quality of governance that a state or an international system 
is capable of establishing. Thus, capacity of states and international systems are considered a 
crucial factor of good governance.56 
                                                   
54 Mark Bevir, Governance: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1. 
55 Ibid., 2. For example, a complete elimination of pirates is a political outcome 
56 Ibid., 101. 
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Maritime governance is simply governance at the sea. It is the process of developing 
maritime policies. 57  There are two components in maritime governance: (1) designing and 
agreeing on the most effective maritime policy, and (2) implementing the policy using political, 
economic, and military strengths. Because maritime governance is a process of governing, states 
and the international system are expected to establish a compelling maritime policy and to put it 
into action. Maritime policies in this thesis specifically refer to counter-piracy measures of a state 
and an international system. Pirates alter their behavior at the sea, if a state or an international 
system has a high capability of establishing maritime governance. The “capability” of establishing 
maritime governance is thus defined as how well a state or an international system can achieve 
both aspects of maritime governance at high quality in order to limit the piratical activities. 
Therefore, understanding the capability for establishing maritime governance is the major 
component of explaining the spatial and temporal variations of piracy.  
 
State-Level Maritime Governance: Sea Power 
 A state with an ability to design, agree on, and implement maritime policies over the 
surrounding seas means that it has a capacity of establishing stable maritime governance. A state’s 
“sea power” denotes its capability to exercise maritime governance. However, there is no clear 
definition of what sea power is because it means different things to different people.58 Historically, 
                                                   
57 M. G. Haward, and Joanna Z. Vince, Oceans Governance in the Twenty-first Century: Managing the Blue Planet 
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008), 5 
58 Geoffrey Till, Encyclopedia of Power, ed. Keith Dowding (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2011), s.v. “Sea Power,” 588. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a famous American naval strategist, is the person “sea power” is mostly associated with, but 
he does not define the word explicitly. 
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the word “sea power” was mostly used as a synonym for naval power, but more than navies are 
participating in the power competitions at sea. A literal interpretation of sea power is thus an ability 
to project power and influence the behavior of other actors at sea.59 
 Alfred Mahan, in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783, 
emphasizes the importance of the sea as a source of national power by noting “the use and control 
of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world.”60 Because trade creates a 
substantial amount of wealth and strength, the economic prosperity of a state is dependent on the 
sea as a means of transportation in peacetime.61 Mahan argues that the fundamental purpose of 
sea power is to maintain the command of the sea to secure seaborne trade.62 Piracy is indeed a 
threat to national security because it disrupts trade. Sea power, defined in this thesis as a capacity 
of a state to establish anti-piracy policies by performing command of the sea, is therefore very 
close to the traditional understanding of sea power. A strong sea power is thus needed for a state 
to win the competition for hegemony. By outlining the naval history of Europe, Mahan emphasizes 
that the dominance of Britain over France and other states in the past two centuries was derived 
from Britain’s capability of controlling the sea.63 Therefore, a high level of sea power, Mahan 
argues, enables a state like Britain to establish a hegemonic control over the maritime trade, and 
the state can consequently exercise control over the world economy and international politics. 
                                                   
59 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Routledge, 2013), 114. 
60 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783 (New York: Sagamore Press, 1957), 
xi. 
61 Ibid., 1. 
62 Till, Seapower, 57. 
63 Ibid., 11. 
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 Julian Corbett also identifies the strategic importance of securing command of the sea.64 
In addition, he points out that naval war must be limited to controlling means of communication, 
instead of acquiring additional territory on land and at sea.65 By that, he argues that an important 
aspect of sea power is to maintain effective communication between different points of the sea 
around a territory. Moreover, he takes sea power more politically by highlighting the connectivity 
of it with land.66 Corbett thinks that sea power determines events both at sea and on land, and the 
extensiveness of sea power can be measured by observing how much events at sea influence 
politics ashore.67 The state’s capability of establishing maritime governance is closely related to 
the quality of the government that the state organizes on land. 
 Geoffrey Till argues that sea power is a relative concept rather than an absolute term, so 
all states have it to some extent.68 It means that the consideration of sea power must be focused 
on which state has more sea power than others.69 Additionally, since sea power signifies an ability 
to influence the behavior of others at sea, its ultimate effectiveness is determined by the strength 
of sea power that the counterpart has.70 Thus, the outcome of maritime governance (in this case, 
a decline of piracy occurrence) depends on the relative strength of a state’s sea power to the power 
that pirates have. 
 As the most important way to measure a state’s capability of establishing maritime 
                                                   
64 “Command of the sea means the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military 
purposes.” Julian Stafford Corbet, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans, Green, 1938), 77, 80. 
65 Ibid., 80. 
66 Till, Seapower, 62. 
67 Till, Encyclopedia of Power, 588. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 589. 
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governance, sea power is a combination of multiple components. 71  This thesis extracts and 
reorganizes aspects of sea power from the literature into four components, and they thoroughly 
represent the essential elements to quantify the theory of sea power in practice: (1) geographic 
characteristics, (2) government quality, (3) military capacity, and (4) economy. 
 First, the geographic characteristics of a state include its position in relation to the sea as 
the key factor. Mahan argues that “the seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers” and “the length 
of its coastline and the characteristic of its harbors are to be considered.”72 Always facing the sea, 
people in a state with a long coastline has a tradition of designing effective policies to use and 
interact with the sea. Such rich culture and history of paying attentions to the sea establishes the 
potential and foundational growth of sea power. 
 Second, the quality of a government determines its capability to design and agree on 
policies. Since the policies of a state are ultimately decided by political interactions, a functioning 
institutional setup is necessary for an extensive governance. 73  Additionally, administrative 
efficiency avoids corruption of the government, and it enables a state to concentrate on and use 
national resources efficiently and appropriately for essential policies.74 Since piracy is a crime, a 
government with a tradition of respecting rule of law would have a high capability to patrol the 
                                                   
71 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 25. In the beginning of his book, Mahan points out six 
characteristics that a state must meet in order to attain sea power: (1) geographical position, (2) physical 
conformation, (3) extent of territory, (4) number of population, (5) national character, and (6) character of the 
government. 
72 Ibid., 30, 37. 
73 Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician,” in Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy, ed. Colin Spencer 
Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London: Routledge, 1999), 49. 
74 Till, Seapower, 90. Without corruption, a state does not need to allocate resources to illegitimate usages and can 
concentrate their resources to rightful policies. 
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surrounding seas. Combined with an efficient use of national resources and the spirit of rule of law, 
a qualified government has an ability to extend sea power in distance. A high level of sea power 
must be sufficiently widespread. 
 Third, military capacity, especially naval power, is the most direct component that is 
necessary for states to maintain sea power. Because military force can influence behavior of other 
actors through violence, the size of a navy is a clear measure of the power-projection capability of 
a state to the surrounding seas.75 Moreover, the eagerness of a state to develop a strong military 
power is reflected by the size of its defense budget.76 The military capacity captures the capability 
of a state to be actively involved and to enforce power over political issues at sea. 
 Fourth, economy reflects a state’s motivation and resource to maintain strong sea power. 
Because seaborne trade provides an opportunity for economic prosperity, “the tendency to trade, 
… is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power.”77 A state with 
strong sea power tends to build a society that values wealth produced from shipping.78 Moreover, 
wealthy states are capable of spending a large amount of money to strengthen their sea power. 
Thus, the economy of a state is a driving force of developing its sea power. 
These four components equally constitute the sea power of a state, and strong sea power 
means that a state has a high capability of establishing maritime governance. The four components 
reflect both the ability to design and agree on the most effective maritime policy and the ability to 
                                                   
75 Brian Benjamin Crisher and Mark Souva, “Power at Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865-2011,” International 
Interactions 40, no. 4 (May 2014): 604. 
76 Till, Seapower, 20. 
77 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 46. 
78 Till, Seapower, 88. 
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implement the policy using strengths. By equally valuing the four components of sea power, a 
state’s capability of establishing maritime governance is fully understood. 
 I hypothesize that pirates particularly target waters near a state with a “medium” level of 
sea power because such states, unlike those other states with strong sea power, are not capable of 
enforcing strict regulations on piracy. Meanwhile, they can provide enough infrastructure and 
economy for pirates to have a profitable “business,” unlike those other states with very weak sea 
power. 
 
International Maritime Governance: Hegemony 
Maritime governance in the international community has been maintained by different 
forms of hegemony. Hegemony does not necessarily mean a condition that only a single state 
dominates international politics. Under some conditions, several states may collectively manage 
the international system as collective hegemony.79 Regional instability arises when the capability 
of hegemonic powers, either single or collective, to maintain an established system declines. 
Regional conflicts including piratical attacks are reduced when hegemony is established. The 
growth and decline of hegemonic powers affect the prosperity and downfall of pirates. 
In the past, “global hegemony” had never emerged in the international system. 
Mearsheimer distinguishes global hegemony from regional hegemony, and he argues that a 
complete global hegemony is impossible.80 Most historical forms of international governance 
                                                   
79 Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 96. 
80 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 41. 
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involved multinational cooperation within certain regions. Indeed, international maritime 
governance became truly global after the ratification of UNCLOS. Thus, international maritime 
governance does not specifically suggest “global,” but it means maritime governance between 
several states of a region. 
 Under hegemony, a single leading power or a few leading powers take the most significant 
role in organizing maritime governance. Hegemony has two aspects: leadership and dominance.81 
Gilpin defines a hegemon as “a single powerful state [that] controls or dominates the lesser states 
in the system.”82 He argues that a hegemon takes leadership in governance of international system 
by establishing “the hierarchy of prestige” based on economic and military power.83 Other states 
accept the establishment of hegemony because the hegemonic power often provides public goods 
like stable international governance.84 In contrast, Keohane focuses on a hegemonic power’s 
dominance over material resources.85 His emphasis on economic dominance points out that the 
power of a hegemon comes from economic wealth. With enough power to dominate others, the 
hegemon is capable of establishing international maritime governance. The international system is 
thus stable when a hegemon is willing and capable of ensuring consistency of the system.86 
Like a single hegemon, a collection of leading powers can show clear leadership and 
                                                   
81 Howard H. Lentner, “Hegemony and Power in International Politics,” in Hegemony and Power: Consensus and 
Coercion in Contemporary Politics, ed. Mark Haugaard (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 90. 
82 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29. 
83 Ibid., 30. 
84 Ibid., 34. 
85 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 32. For Keohane, a hegemon must “have control over raw materials, control over 
sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantage in the production of highly valued goods.” 
86 Ibid., 138. 
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dominance over other states in the international system. Pointing out the Concert of Europe as an 
example, Jervis argues that it is “characterized by an unusually high and self-conscious level of 
cooperation” between leading powers.87 Collective hegemony is possible if powerful states can 
cooperate under a shared interest, while each state is strong enough to ensure the checks and 
balances.88 If several states are capable and willing to collectively establish hegemony under a 
coordinated policy, then such collective hegemony has a high capability of establishing stable 
international governance. 
A hegemon gradually loses its capability of maintaining governance as its power declines. 
Gilpin focuses on the change in the costs and benefits of governance as a determinant of the 
mechanism of change in hegemony. 89  As the cost of maintenance increases, the hegemonic 
powers reduce some costs associated with continuation and become less willing to provide 
maritime governance as a public good. The economic and technological advantages that the 
hegemonic powers originally had are then diminished, so the hegemon’s capability of maintaining 
stable maritime governance is less credible.90 
The hegemon’s inability to manage maritime order gives several signals to other states in 
the system. First, these other states can no longer take maritime governance for granted, but rather 
they will have to be concerned with the governance problem. The decline of the current 
                                                   
87 Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” World Politics 38, no. 
1 (October 1985): 59. 
88 Clark, Hegemony in International Society, 96. 
89 “Although control over an international system provides economic benefits to the dominant power or powers, 
domination also involves costs in manpower and material resources.” Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 
156. 
90 Ibid., 185. 
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international maritime governance suggests that states lose secured sea lanes which are necessary 
for international trade. Copeland notes if a state is worried about the future of international trade, 
it is more likely to take action against the hegemon to build a more favorable system for itself.91 
Second, states consider the decline of a hegemon as an opportunity to expand their own power.92 
Because the relative power of the hegemon drops, the costs for opposing states to overthrow the 
existing system becomes lower.93 With these signals given to the surrounding states, international 
maritime governance is likely to collapse. 
Following the disintegration of established international maritime governance, the 
international system must go through a period of structural change with redistribution of power. 
Multiple states compete to gain a hegemonic power of the next system. Under such an environment, 
competitors do not maintain maritime governance because states are busy fighting against one 
another and do not pay attention to the stability of the seas.94 The opportunity cost of pirating is 
reduced because the probability of being captured is low without any hegemonic powers patrolling 
the sea.95 Thus, pirates consider the collapse of maritime governance as an opportunity to expand 
their activities. Moreover, pirates can also be used by states as a tool to intercept economic 
activities of other competitors. Sometimes piracy is even funded and encouraged by states under 
                                                   
91 “The lower the expectations of future trade, the more a dependent state will worry about its long-term security 
situation, and thus the greater the likelihood that it will choose hard-line policies or all-out war.” Dale C. Copeland, 
Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 36. 
92 “Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power, on the contrary, they face a constant 
incentive to change it in their favor.” Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2. 
93 “Decline is accompanied by lack of social cooperation, by emphasis on rights rather than emphasis on duty, and 
by decreasing productivity.” Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 187, 189. 
94 Albert J. Bergesen and Omar Lizardo, “International Terrorism and the World-System,” Sociological Theory 22, 
no. 1 (March 2004): 50. Bergesen and Lizardo argue that terrorism occur when a dominant state is in decline and the 
international system does not pay attention to regional stability. 
95 Refer Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion on the cost-benefit calculations of becoming a pirate. 
Ishikawa 26 
 
the international system without stable maritime governance.96 
Through power competition, a new hegemon starts to rise. A new international 
governance can be established by either single hegemony or hegemony under multiple states 
dominating the others collectively. Jervis notes that international cooperation only occurs after a 
devastating war or when a common enemy tries to rise to power.97 States tend to grow a shared 
interest by having the same experience. Collective hegemony is thus possible when states share 
similar policies and traditions in relation to other states in the international community.98 Although 
states are suspicious of each other, stable maritime governance can be established under collective 
hegemony. 
Like the previous one, the new hegemonic power dominates the international system with 
its economic and technological advantages. 99  Those advantages incentivize the emerging 
hegemonic power to earn profits by exporting their superior products to other states. It then tries 
to eliminate any threats against the maintenance of safe sea lanes to ensure profitability of the 
expanded international trades. One policy that it implements is the suppression of piracy. As a 
hegemonic power, it takes a leadership in establishing new international maritime governance to 
secure command of the sea from piratical attacks. Thus, the hegemony is now willing and capable 
of providing stable governance at its own expense because the hegemonic power knows that it will 
benefit the most. 
                                                   
96 Many historical examples of state-sponsored piracy, or privateering, are introduced in Chapter 5. 
97 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” 60. 
98 Keohane, After Hegemony, 51-52. 
99 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 106. 
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 Therefore, I hypothesize that pirates prosper when states are competing for dominance 
after the collapse of established international maritime governance. Pirates are combatted when a 
hegemonic power, either single or collective, rises to establish new international maritime 
governance. 
 
Methods 
 The empirical research is divided into two sections: a numerical analysis to reveal the 
relationship between the number of piracy incidents and sea power of each coastal state, and a 
comparative case study to survey how international maritime governance of the past had 
influenced the rise and fall of piracy. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable of the numerical analysis is the number of piracy incidents for 
each state. The dataset used in this thesis was organized by Brandon Prins and is based on the 
annual reports of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).100 The IMB is a division of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which aims to fight against maritime crimes and 
malpractices.101 The IMB’s data on piratical attacks are often recognized as the most reliable 
source for piracy statistics.102 In fact, the United Nations’ International Maritime Organization 
                                                   
100 See “Global Piracy Incidents Data,” Brandon C. Prins, University of Tennessee, 
http://brandonprins.weebly.com/minervaresearch.html for the original dataset. 
101 IMB, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships-- 2016 Annual Report. 2 
102 Daxecker and Prins, “Insurgents of the Sea,” 945; Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 60. 
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also relies on the IMB’s data for most of its piracy reporting.103 The IMB defines piracy as “[a]n 
act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the apparent intent or capacity to use force in the furtherance of that act.”104 
This definition includes all attempted and actual attacks happening both within the territorial sea 
of a state and on the high seas. Because the data are based on self-reporting by shipowners and 
local authorities, the actual number of incidents could be much higher. 105  However, 
underreporting does not mean that the regional variation of piracy incidents is biased. The dataset 
from the IMB still provides an important insight for the cross-spatial analysis of piracy incidents. 
In this thesis, the total number of actual and attempted attacks in 121 countries that were 
reported to IMB in between 1995 and 2015 are used. The overall trend of pirates’ preferred 
locations does not change often. Instead, pirates assess the capability of states to govern the 
surrounding seas based on the past behavior. By summing data of two decades, it is possible to 
understand the general tendency of the preferred location of piratical attacks. The total number of 
actual and attempted attacks between 1995 and 2015 as the dependent variable is convincing for 
revealing the relationship between contemporary piracy and states’ capability of establishing 
maritime governance. 
 
 
                                                   
103 Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 60. 
104 ICC International Maritime Bureau, ICC IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships-- 2009 Annual Report 
(London: ICC IMB, 2010), 3. 
105 Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, 68. 
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Independent Variables 
 The explanatory variable in the numerical analysis is essentially sea power of each state. 
Several independent variables, or components, are selected to quantify sea power: geographic 
characteristics, government quality, military capacity, and economy. In order to measure the overall 
sea power of states between 1995 and 2015, data are averaged for most variables. The state’s 
capability of establishing maritime governance is somewhat sticky and changes only gradually 
throughout a century, so the overall sea power is better understood by averaging statistical data for 
the past two decades. 
All variables are then converted to percentile ranks, which range from 0 (lowest) to 100 
(highest), to standardize the distribution of data.106 Original independent variables range in scale 
of number. A percentile rank scale makes the distribution of data comparable without bias. 
Additionally, sea power of a state is a relative concept. Because the only thing a percentile rank 
shows is ranking, it indicates the level of states’ sea power in relation to other states. At the end, a 
sea power index with a maximum score of 100 is calculated by taking average of the percentile 
ranks of the four components. All four aspects are weighted equally because all of them are equally 
important in considering sea power of a state. 
Geographic characteristics are quantified by a ratio of the coastline length to the total land 
area from CIA World Fact Book.107 The ratio represents how much a state is exposed to sea in 
                                                   
106 Percentile ranks are calculated using the formula 𝑃 =
100 ×(𝑅−0.5)
𝑁
, where P is the percentile rank, R is the rank 
order, and N is the number of variables in the distribution. 
107 “The World Fact Book,” Central Intelligence Agency, April 01, 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/. 
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relation to the size of its territorial land by showing the coastline length per square kilometer of 
land. The ratio is then converted to a percentile rank of the geographic characteristics. 
Government quality is measured based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
issued by the World Bank.108 Among six indicators the WGI includes, “government effectiveness” 
and “rule of law” capture the quality of government the most by quantifying a government’s 
capability to prepare and enforce policies.109 Since the World Bank issues these indicators in 
percentile rank scale from 1996 to 2015, the data are averaged to estimate the overall quality of 
government in the two decades. Two indicators are then averaged to derive the government quality 
of a state in percentile rank. 
Military capacity is measured by the military expenditure as a share of GDP and the total 
tonnage of naval ships. The military expenditure as a share of GDP is from the Stockholm Peace 
Research Institute database. 110 It is an indicator that shows how much a state is focused on 
spending money on military in relation to other parts of the economy. The data are averaged 
between 1995 and 2015. Total tonnage of naval ships has historically been considered as a 
reasonable scale to measure naval power of states.111 The dataset on total tonnage is found on 
                                                   
108 The actual dataset is found at “The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project,” The World Bank Group, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home. 
109 Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues” Policy Research Working Paper 5430. The World Bank Development Research Group, 
Washington, D.C., 2010, 6. Government Effectiveness measures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies,” while Rule 
of Law measures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence.” 
110 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
111 “The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 uses displacement tonnage as its primary criterion for limiting the size of 
each state’s navy.” Crisher and Souva, “Power at Sea,” 608. 
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Crisher and Souva’s “Power at Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865-2011.”112 Although their data 
cover only 60 countries and go up to 2011, the dataset provides major estimates of states’ naval 
capacities. The percentile ranks for each variable are then averaged to derive the overall military 
capacity of each state. 
For economy, GDP per capita and total expenditure of trade are considered. GDP per 
capita in current US dollars can estimate the overall wealth of the individuals in a state. The 
average of 1995 to 2015 from the World Bank database is used. 113 Total merchandise trade 
combines both exports and imports between a state and the rest of the world. The average of 1995 
to 2015 is taken from the World Trade Organization’s database.114 Since a substantial proportion 
of the international trade takes place through shipping, the total amount of money spent by a 
country on trade shows the connectivity of its economy to the sea. At the same time, these two 
indicators show the average economic power of a state in the two decades by emphasizing the 
wealth of the population and their reliance on international seaborne trade. The percentile ranks 
for each variable are again averaged to derive the overall economy of each state in percentile rank. 
 
 
                                                   
112 Brian Benjamin Crisher and Mark Souva, “Power at Sea: A Naval Dataset, 1865-2011,” Harvard Dataverse, 
December 30, 2013, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2F24098. 
They calculated total tonnage based on the data from The Military Balance, published by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies and The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, published by the United States 
Naval Institute.  
113 “GDP per capita (current US$),” World Bank Open Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. 
114 “Time Series on International Trade,” World Trade Organization Statistics Database, 
http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E. 
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Case Studies 
 Through a comparative historical survey, the qualitative part of the empirical study looks 
at how international maritime governance of a certain time period contributes to the prosperity and 
downfall of piracy. The case study method is suited for this section because a detailed analysis of 
each historical case can reveal causal mechanisms to test my hypothesis. Moreover, reliable 
historical statistics on the number of piratical attacks are not available. Even if they were available, 
a quantitative analysis could only show the cross-temporal patterns of piracy, and it would not 
provide enough insights to understand the mechanisms behind the temporal variation. Instead of 
using the actual number of piracy incidents from each time period as data, each case examines 
historical records on major pirates of the time as well as the international system behind them. Five 
cases were selected from a variety of time periods and regions to ensure my theory is as widely 
applicable as possible. The case study chapter will then cover three cases in depth to compare and 
contrast different forms of international maritime governance and the development of piracy as a 
consequence. 
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Chapter 4 Numerical Analysis 
Introduction 
 Chapter 4 demonstrates the connection between the degree of states’ sea power and the 
frequency of piratical activities. The data are organized in a manner of descriptive statistics to see 
the spatial variation of contemporary piracy. The descriptive statistics help to capture a 
generalizable pattern by illustrating how each state’s capability of governing the surrounding seas 
serves as the explanatory variable for the spatial variation of piratical activity. 
 The hypothesis presented in the theory chapter was that pirates particularly target waters 
near a state with a “medium” level of sea power. These states provide sufficient levels of 
infrastructure and economy for pirates to have a profitable “business,” but they are not capable of 
enforcing strict counter-piracy measures like states with “high” levels of sea power. 
 The numerical analysis in this thesis does not include an inferential statistical analysis. 
No regression analysis is conducted, and the results displayed in this chapter do not infer a 
statistical significance of the general trend. Instead, this exercise plots the level of states’ sea power 
and the number of piracy incidents on graphs. The results illustrate general patterns and trends of 
piratical activities across states with different capabilities of establishing maritime governance. 
The visual presentations in this chapter include a set of findings that explain the spatial variation 
of contemporary piracy. 
 The graphs were plotted for multiple rounds to test the consistency of my hypothesis. First, 
an overall trend is presented. The first graph plots the aggregated values of both piracy incidents 
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and sea power in the period between 1995 and 2015. Second, the analysis is then divided into three 
seven-year periods: from 1995 to 2001, from 2002 to 2008, and from 2009 to 2015. By doing so, 
the consistency of the relationship across the two decades can be tested. Third, the analysis is 
divided into five regions: Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas. The 
regional division is based on the piracy incident dataset organized by Prins.115 This section intends 
to test the consistency of the relationship between the level of a state’s sea power and the number 
of piracy incidents the state observes. 
 
Results 
 The data from 121 countries from 1995 to 2015 are collected and organized. Table 4.1 
presents the total number of piracy incidents from 1995 to 2015. In total, 5,505 piracy incidents, 
both actual and attempted, were reported to the International Maritime Bureau. Indonesia had the 
highest number of attacks (1,536), while 39 countries saw none. Table 4.2 presents the Sea Power 
Index calculated by the methods described in Chapter 3. The values for 1995-2015 are not the 
average of the three values but are the aggregated values that were calculated using the entire data 
from 1995 to 2015. The United Kingdom had the highest score (86.91), while the Democratic 
Republic of Congo had the lowest (9.04) for the 1995-2015 period.          
                                                   
115 See “Global Piracy Incidents Data,” Brandon C. Prins, University of Tennessee, 
http://brandonprins.weebly.com/minervaresearch.html for the original dataset. 
 Table 4.1 Number of Piracy Incidents Reported to the IMB 
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 Total Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 Total 
Albania 6 0 0 6 Egypt 6 2 20 28 
Algeria 2 0 1 3 El Salvador 2 1 0 3 
Angola 7 10 2 19 Equatorial Guinea 1 1 0 2 
Argentina 0 1 0 1 Eritrea 0 2 0 2 
Australia 1 0 0 1 Estonia 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 Fiji 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 129 202 105 436 Finland 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 1 0 1 France 1 0 0 1 
Benin 0 1 23 24 Gabon 11 7 3 21 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 Gambia 0 1 0 1 
Brazil 77 34 20 131 Germany 0 0 0 0 
Cambodia 3 0 0 3 Ghana 18 27 14 59 
Cameroon 20 16 11 47 Greece 4 0 0 4 
Canada 0 0 0 0 Guatemala 1 0 0 1 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 0 Guinea 23 18 23 64 
Chile 0 0 0 0 Guinea-Bissau 4 2 1 7 
China 61 9 9 79 Guyana 5 27 6 38 
Colombia 14 27 31 72 Haiti 2 14 15 31 
Comoros 0 0 0 0 Honduras 1 2 0 3 
Congo 2 1 23 26 India 122 101 71 294 
Costa Rica 0 1 8 9 Indonesia 522 518 496 1536 
Cote d’Ivoire 28 18 20 66 Iran 19 6 0 25 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 Iraq 0 15 2 17 
Cuba 0 4 0 4 Ireland 0 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 Israel 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 2 0 0 2 Italy 6 0 0 6 
Djibouti 1 0 0 1 Jamaica 8 26 0 34 
Dominican Republic 19 16 2 37 Japan 0 0 0 0 
DR Congo 4 8 14 26 Jordan 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador 46 18 18 82 Kenya 12 16 6 34 
 Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 Total Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 Total 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 Russia 2 0 0 2 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 Saudi Arabia 0 1 0 1 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 Senegal 12 16 0 28 
Liberia 0 5 4 9 Sierra Leone 9 8 5 22 
Libya 0 0 0 0 Singapore 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 Slovenia 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar 2 6 0 8 Solomon Islands 4 3 0 7 
Malaysia 82 60 108 250 Somalia 63 106 442 611 
Mauritania 1 4 1 6 South Africa 2 1 0 3 
Mauritius 0 0 0 0 South Korea 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 2 0 0 2 Spain 0 0 0 0 
Montenegro 0 0 0 0 Sri Lanka 39 11 0 50 
Morocco 3 3 2 8 Sudan 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 2 7 6 15 Sweden 0 0 0 0 
Myanmar 12 2 2 16 Syria 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 Taiwan 4 2 0 6 
Netherlands 1 0 0 1 Tanzania 24 51 10 85 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 Thailand 60 15 6 81 
Nicaragua 2 0 0 2 Timor 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 57 191 148 396 Togo 1 4 30 35 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 Trinidad and Tobago 1 4 0 5 
Norway 0 0 0 0 Tunisia 0 0 0 0 
Oman 0 4 5 9 Turkey 4 0 0 4 
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 United Arab Emirates 1 2 0 3 
Panama 2 4 0 6 United Kingdom 0 3 0 3 
Papua New Guinea 6 2 1 9 United States 3 3 0 6 
Peru 12 44 32 88 Uruguay 1 0 0 1 
Philippines 117 45 34 196 Venezuela 15 38 18 71 
Poland 0 0 0 0 Vietnam 24 59 76 159 
Portugal 1 0 0 1 Yemen 8 5 0 13 
Qatar 0 0 0 0      
 Table 4.2 Sea Power Index 
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Albania 32.23 41.50 44.49 36.85 Egypt 48.03 48.10 43.02 46.24 
Algeria 33.03 37.33 38.49 37.65 El Salvador 39.15 39.29 39.16 38.89 
Angola 17.87 22.79 25.57 23.51 Equatorial Guinea 37.84 38.22 41.91 41.30 
Argentina 48.24 41.15 41.21 43.37 Eritrea 37.93 47.69 27.20 34.90 
Australia 69.52 69.61 72.04 70.93 Estonia 59.48 71.53 74.52 70.43 
Bahrain 69.75 69.23 69.35 70.15 Fiji 52.47 53.43 45.60 49.77 
Bangladesh 33.24 30.97 33.71 32.60 Finland 62.97 62.34 65.02 62.59 
Belgium 58.17 56.63 56.05 57.49 France 78.03 77.12 76.87 77.14 
Benin 19.87 20.57 20.09 19.69 Gabon 42.59 39.02 38.88 38.87 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 19.80 32.94 27.03 29.02 Gambia 28.06 25.98 30.44 25.97 
Brazil 49.25 46.85 48.16 48.35 Germany 72.67 71.09 71.85 71.63 
Cambodia 33.57 21.64 30.58 30.44 Ghana 27.32 27.84 30.20 29.17 
Cameroon 17.92 19.62 19.30 18.69 Greece 80.68 79.48 75.75 78.73 
Canada 77.96 76.87 77.64 77.21 Guatemala 30.45 26.69 25.01 26.80 
Cape Verde 64.44 61.00 60.81 61.36 Guinea 22.65 27.36 26.64 24.44 
Chile 68.59 67.81 68.55 68.04 Guinea-Bissau 24.01 31.32 33.96 30.41 
China 48.53 52.43 55.64 53.20 Guyana 31.44 37.38 32.51 34.79 
Colombia 46.53 47.69 50.13 48.71 Haiti 26.98 33.75 33.82 25.70 
Comoros 38.52 38.25 36.85 37.66 Honduras 29.37 30.39 34.52 31.63 
Congo 23.47 27.00 31.84 27.76 India 53.51 54.56 54.85 54.47 
Costa Rica 66.00 63.51 64.58 64.26 Indonesia 51.84 50.01 51.83 51.83 
Cote d’Ivoire 23.55 25.22 28.60 25.59 Iran 41.47 42.05 43.25 42.44 
Croatia 62.93 61.54 61.68 64.16 Iraq 16.43 29.60 36.70 25.72 
Cuba 44.03 59.68 61.12 52.52 Ireland 64.77 63.57 62.46 63.52 
Cyprus 77.70 70.18 69.80 73.40 Israel 69.47 67.94 68.50 69.30 
Denmark 81.66 79.72 79.53 80.14 Italy 78.51 75.52 74.32 75.78 
Djibouti 46.01 49.22 32.37 48.04 Jamaica 48.50 48.26 47.52 47.24 
Dominican Republic 44.70 42.17 41.03 42.85 Japan 82.13 81.52 82.03 81.94 
DR Congo 7.34 9.35 9.90 9.04 Jordan 49.47 49.73 50.34 49.67 
Ecuador 51.36 51.13 53.62 52.30 Kenya 23.26 26.35 29.09 25.93 
 Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Kuwait 77.19 77.30 74.96 77.45 Russia 63.79 67.72 69.92 68.02 
Latvia 41.87 56.35 51.73 50.33 Saudi Arabia 53.22 54.78 56.54 55.53 
Lebanon 65.87 63.66 61.75 62.92 Senegal 35.75 35.67 34.96 34.06 
Liberia 16.64 16.69 18.55 17.14 Sierra Leone 29.95 26.04 19.92 26.49 
Libya 37.31 30.22 25.48 32.73 Singapore 82.36 84.07 87.68 85.49 
Lithuania 36.84 40.96 41.00 40.97 Slovenia 50.99 53.31 51.20 51.22 
Madagascar 31.29 31.31 22.78 28.60 Solomon Islands 52.03 43.19 46.22 46.09 
Malaysia 63.28 64.15 62.06 63.46 Somalia 21.46 21.45 11.28 12.37 
Mauritania 34.66 33.82 29.89 32.68 South Africa 46.52 43.62 44.88 44.24 
Mauritius 52.92 52.53 51.96 52.14 South Korea 76.40 78.79 80.73 78.84 
Mexico 50.23 49.40 48.17 49.76 Spain 73.65 71.01 70.61 71.37 
Montenegro 52.80 55.51 53.37 53.62 Sri Lanka 61.39 59.71 58.39 60.97 
Morocco 46.97 46.19 46.46 46.61 Sudan 23.30 32.39 32.95 30.60 
Mozambique 24.81 23.61 23.58 23.67 Sweden 71.93 68.50 65.05 69.19 
Myanmar 30.52 24.82 38.41 33.69 Syria 33.98 31.83 17.42 30.67 
Namibia 45.66 47.30 51.23 48.46 Taiwan 81.87 81.35 82.01 81.90 
Netherlands 77.73 76.07 75.31 76.49 Tanzania 38.58 35.25 34.66 36.11 
New Zealand 73.21 69.92 69.75 71.37 Thailand 58.18 53.28 54.59 55.32 
Nicaragua 28.14 26.34 26.26 26.37 Timor 41.32 47.60 44.64 46.42 
Nigeria 18.40 19.35 19.73 19.82 Togo 26.33 20.10 22.94 21.68 
North Korea 39.57 39.15 39.43 39.61 Trinidad and Tobago 51.95 51.84 52.95 51.87 
Norway 82.50 80.46 81.24 81.72 Tunisia 50.75 48.81 50.92 50.23 
Oman 68.80 68.59 68.94 68.68 Turkey 64.30 65.90 65.35 66.17 
Pakistan 41.57 39.30 36.93 39.66 United Arab Emirates 71.06 69.57 71.61 70.93 
Panama 50.22 60.69 63.84 51.18 United Kingdom 87.79 87.69 86.84 86.91 
Papua New Guinea 35.96 27.60 28.18 30.18 United States 75.52 76.66 76.88 76.52 
Peru 45.24 37.94 42.59 42.68 Uruguay 52.22 47.67 49.54 50.03 
Philippines 57.32 52.21 51.73 53.65 Venezuela 42.89 37.60 35.19 37.31 
Poland 53.10 52.85 53.37 53.43 Vietnam 41.67 46.27 48.72 47.65 
Portugal 71.19 69.36 68.80 70.49 Yemen 42.17 43.62 41.82 42.30 
Qatar 71.37 75.21 75.27 74.75      
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Overall Trend 
 Figure 4.1 shows the overall trend of the relationship between Sea Power Index and total 
number of piracy incidents between 1995 and 2015. Although there are states with zero or only a 
few numbers of piratical attacks anywhere along the sea power spectrum, states that saw large 
numbers of attacks are concentrated in the medium level of sea power. Three exceptions are 
Somalia (12.37, 611), Nigeria (19.82, 396), and Bangladesh (32.73, 436). All states with a Sea 
Power Index of 65 or higher had less than ten piracy incidents. The graph illustrates a general trend 
that many states with a medium level of sea power experienced substantial numbers of piratical 
attacks. 
 
Figure 4.1 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 
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Trend by Time 
 The data are disaggregated into three periods to examine the consistency of the trend over 
the two decades. Dividing 21 years into three terms incorporated international shifts into the 
analysis. In fact, the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 were 
turning points for the international system. Although the worldwide number of piratical attacks 
increased in 2002-2003 and 2009-2010 in response to a shift in states’ attention away from 
maintaining maritime security, the following graphs indicate that the general relationship between 
the level of sea power and the number of piracy incidents is still consistent. In any cases, states at 
the higher end of sea power spectrum had significantly low frequency of piratical attacks, which 
was also consistent throughout periods. 
 
Figure 4.2 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2001 
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Figure 4.3 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 2002 and 2008 
 
 
Figure 4.4 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 2009 and 2015 
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Trend by Regions 
 The data are disaggregated into five regions to examine the consistency of the trend 
throughout the world. Dividing the data into five regions, like periodization, also helps to isolate 
the level of sea power as the explanatory variable for the spatial variation of piratical activity. The 
following graphs indicate that capability for establishing maritime governance affects piratical 
activity more so than regional or cultural variation. Although the range of sea power values for 
each region varies, a consistent trend is that states that observed high number of attacks tended to 
have medium levels of sea power instead of high levels of sea power. States at the lower end of 
the sea power spectrum also tend to record small numbers of attacks. Europe is exceptional in the 
trend because the number of attacks observed in the region is substantially lower than other regions. 
The graph for Europe suggests that states with high capability of establishing maritime governance 
still experience few incidents due to states’ significantly large volume of maritime trade, which 
become targets for piratical attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ishikawa 43 
 
Figure 4.5 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 31 states in Africa 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 25 states in Europe 
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Figure 4.7 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 19 states in the Middle East 
 
 
Figure 4.8 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 23 states in Asia-Pacific 
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Figure 4.9 The relationship between Sea Power Index value and total number of piracy incidents 
between 1995 and 2015 for 23 states in the Americas 
 
 
Discussion 
 The graphs presented above illustrate the relationship between the level of sea power and 
the number of piracy incidents that states observed in the 1995-2015 period. One must note that 
there are states that recorded no incidents at any level of the Sea Power Index. At the same time, 
there are more states at the medium level of sea power with higher numbers of attacks compared 
to states at either ends of the spectrum.  
 Generally, criminal organizations like pirates need a minimum level of governance in 
order to maintain their business.116 In fact, most contemporary piratical groups make profit by 
                                                   
116 Percy and Shortland, “The Business of Piracy in Somalia,” 553. 
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seizing ships and cargos to resell at a market as “phantom ships.”117 The states with a medium 
level of sea power are capable of providing sufficient infrastructure for circulating captured ships 
and funding their businesses.118 However, the Somali and Nigerian pirates employ an exceptional 
piratical “business model,” because they primarily target crews and vessels as hostages in return 
for ransom money, which does not require any additional effort to earn incomes.119 Since pirates 
in Africa only require a large volume of maritime traffic passing nearby, piratical attacks can occur 
near the coast of states at the lower end of the sea power spectrum. Somalia and Nigeria thus record 
high numbers of attacks even though their capability of establishing maritime governance is 
significantly low. 
 Therefore, the numerical analysis conducted in this chapter describes the current situation 
of piracy in relation to states’ capability of establishing maritime governance on the surrounding 
seas. Although the graphs reveal that states with any level of sea power might experience zero or 
few piracy incidents, the frequency of attacks tends to be high in states with medium levels of sea 
power. The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter help to visualize the general trend of 
contemporary piracy. 
  
                                                   
117 James Kraska, Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 40. 
118 Ibid., 38. 
119 Ibid., 48. 
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Chapter 5 Case Studies 
Introduction 
 Chapter 5 examines the history of piracy to test the causal mechanisms proposed in the 
theory chapter. The first section of this chapter explores the general history of piracy from 2000 
BCE to the present. It specifically focuses on five major cases: the ancient Mediterranean during 
the third to first centuries BCE, Northern Europe between the ninth to fourteenth centuries, the 
Caribbean between the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, the Barbary Coast between the sixteenth 
to nineteenth centuries, and Northeast Asia between the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. These 
cases show that the rise of piracy coincided with the decline of hegemony, while pirates were 
suppressed by a hegemonic power’s capability of establishing maritime governance. 
Table 5.1 Overview of the International Systems under Each Piracy Case 
Region Time Hegemony Before Competitors Hegemony After 
Ancient 
Mediterranean 
3C – 1C BCE n/a Roman Republic 
Carthage, Macedonia, 
Seleucid 
Roman Republic 
Northern Europe 9C – 14C Carolingian Empire  Christian kingdoms, 
Nordic communities 
Hanseatic League 
Caribbean 15C – 18C n/a Spain, Portugal, 
England, France, the 
Netherlands 
British Empire 
Barbary Coast 16C – 19C Two Roman Empires European states, 
Ottoman Empire 
European states 
Northeast Asia 14C – 17C Yuan China, 
Kamakura Japan 
Various regional 
powers in China, 
Japan, Korea 
Ming China, 
Ashikaga Japan, 
Toyotomi Japan 
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 The first section aims to align each historical episode with the causal mechanisms by 
identifying prior hegemonic powers, competing powers, and the hegemonic powers that took 
leadership in suppressing piracy. As shown in Table 5.1, the ancient Mediterranean and the 
Caribbean did not have hegemonic powers before, so their stories begin when pirates started to 
attack ships at the backscene of states’ power competitions.120 Because three of the five cases are 
discussed in depth later in this chapter, those three cases are only briefly sketched in this section. 
 All episodes of piracy were equally met with backlash from hegemonic powers, in some 
cases, the single ones, and in other cases, the collective ones. The ancient Mediterranean and the 
Caribbean had single powers that took leadership in establishing international maritime 
governance, whereas Northern Europe, the Barbary Coast, and Northeast Asia had hegemonies 
under coalitions of multiple powers. 
 In the second half of this chapter, three cases are examined in depth to explore the 
relationship between piratical activities and two types of hegemony, either single or collective. The 
first case analyzes the ancient Mediterranean as an example of maritime governance under single 
hegemony of the Roman Republic. The second case analyzes the Barbary Coast as an example of 
maritime governance under collective hegemony of the Christian European states. The third case 
analyzes Northeast Asia as an unusual example that lacked a clear intention of establishing 
collective hegemony, yet states cooperated to some extent for suppressing piracy. By providing 
two different forms of maritime governance, these cases are desirable choices for comparison. 
                                                   
120 The Spanish Empire was a dominant power in the fifteenth century Europe, but no hegemony had been 
established in the Caribbean until the eighteenth century. 
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Moreover, because pirates of the Caribbean and Northern Europe were suppressed under single 
hegemony and collective hegemony respectively, the mechanisms discovered in the later section 
of this chapter are applicable to those cases that are only briefly sketched. 
 
General History of Piracy 
Introduction 
 The history of piracy is a cyclical trend where the rise and fall of pirates repeat 
continually.121 The frequency of piratical activities increased when the international system was 
disorganized in the absence of a hegemonic power. In other times, pirates were suppressed when 
a hegemonic power or a group of states were capable of and willing to take leadership in 
establishing international maritime governance. Although historically the motivation of pirates 
was mostly economic, the wave-like pattern was strongly influenced by the international politics 
of the time.122 
Piracy is one of the oldest international crimes and has been observed wherever maritime 
trades occur.123 The first record of piratical attacks was written in cuneiform characters by the 
Sumerian people of Mesopotamia around 2000 BCE.124 The Greek historian Thucydides identifies 
King Minos of Crete in the early fourteenth century BCE as the first ruler to suppress pirates in 
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the eastern Mediterranean. 125 Pirates, sometimes even with support from states, were able to 
acquire wealth when multiple states were competing with each other to gain hegemonic power. 
 
The Ancient Mediterranean: The Third to First Centuries BCE 
 The first attempt to establish stable maritime governance over the entire Mediterranean 
was done by the Roman Republic. Until the Romans achieved a regional hegemony, however, 
piracy in the Mediterranean flourished. Especially between the third and first centuries BCE, wars 
between the expanding Roman Republic and Carthage in the west, as well as the Macedonian and 
Seleucid empires in the east, caused regional instability and gave pirates plenty of opportunities to 
prey on trade vessels.126 In the late Roman Republic, when Cicero claimed pirates as the enemy 
of all mankind, piratical attacks were threatening the maritime trade along the Italian coast.127  
With Rome’s naval superiority in the Mediterranean, the Republic was ready to suppress 
piracy. In 67 BCE, the Roman senate appointed Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, or Pompey the Great, 
as a military dictator to eliminate piracy from the region.128 Pompey the Great’s campaign marked 
the first complete effort to eliminate piracy in history, and the Mediterranean was free from pirates 
until the decline of the two Roman Empires.129 The Roman Republic took a leadership as the 
hegemon of the Mediterranean to provide stable maritime governance, a much needed public good. 
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Northern Europe: The Ninth to Fourteenth Centuries 
 On the other side of the European continent, the people from Scandinavia started to sail 
around the North and the Baltic Seas in the eighth century using “longships.” The creation of  
Viking longships owed to technological advancements that enabled them to sail faster and to 
greater distances.130 From the mid-eighth to the early ninth centuries, the Carolingian Empire of 
the Franks controlled most of Western and Central Europe as the defender and the hegemon of 
Christendom. 131  The Vikings started to raid Northern Europe initially as a response to the 
northward expansion of the Carolingian Empire for the purpose of spreading Christianity.132 In 
fact, the early raids recorded in the British Isles and France targeted only Christian facilities.133 
However, the Viking movement increased significantly after the disintegration of the Carolingian 
Empire around 840.134 As a result of the collapse of the hegemonic power, the coasts, especially 
around France, lost their ability to defend cities as well as sea lanes.135 Since then, the Vikings 
expanded their control over the seas around Europe while weak and fragmented kingdoms were 
competing across the European continent. 
 The end of the Viking Age came when the Scandinavian kingdoms converted to 
Christianity in the eleventh century. In the 1050s and 1060s, the English and the French began to 
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defeat the Viking raids, and many kings of the Vikings died in battles.136 With the conversion to 
Christianity and the decline of the Viking kingdoms, the Scandinavians were gradually 
incorporated into the European cultural sphere. Viking activity conducted by the Scandinavian 
kingdoms had disappeared by this time. However, Scandinavian piracy continued to flourish in 
Europe until stable maritime governance was established by the Hanseatic League in the fourteenth 
century. 
 Even though the Hanseatic League was not collective hegemony that dominated the 
region militarily, it controlled the maritime trade of the Medieval Northern Europe by taking a 
leadership in managing sea traffic. The Hanseatic League was founded among port cities along the 
North and the Baltic Seas in the thirteenth century, and one of the purposes of its foundation was 
to defend their maritime trade from pirates.137 In 1265, the League declared war on piracy, and 
asked all member cities to contribute to its suppression.138 The Prussian towns added a substantial 
amount of naval strength to the League in 1398, and the number of piratical attacks declined 
drastically.139 By the beginning of the fifteenth century, the North and the Baltic Seas were free 
from piracy as a result of the League’s capability to establish maritime governance over Northern 
Europe. 
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The Caribbean Sea: The Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries 
 The pirates of the Caribbean, between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, are the most 
famous and well documented of piracy cases, often called the Golden Age of piracy. Their 
activities reflected the international system of the time, and pirates were suppressed as the British 
Empire acquired a hegemonic power over the Caribbean Sea. Soon after the Spanish and the 
Portuguese arrived at the Americas, they monopolized the wealth of the continent. The division of 
the oceans between the Iberians under the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and the Treaty of Zaragoza 
in 1529 marked the beginning of piratical activities in the Caribbean.140 Other European states 
like the British and the French started to challenge the trade monopoly by issuing letters of marque, 
which authorized merchants and pirates to commit violence against foreign ships as privateers.141  
 The Caribbean Sea became a sanctuary for pirates for two reasons. First, it was an 
important sea lane for the Spanish to import gold, treasures, and agricultural products, so pirates 
were able to gain a large amount of wealth from each attack.142 Moreover, the Caribbean Sea had 
plenty of small islands and harbors, and such geographical features made the Spanish navy 
incapable of policing the region.143 The pirates of the Caribbean flourished as a consequence of 
the power struggles between major European states. Piracy was even encouraged when the British, 
the French, and the Dutch considered privateering as a tool for gaining power. 
 As the British Empire gradually dominated over other powers, it was determined to 
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eliminate piracy from the Caribbean. In 1698, the English under King William III passed the Piracy 
Act to illegalize piracy and privateering.144 The British no longer needed to use privateers as a 
tool of war, especially after it achieved naval supremacy at the end of the Seven Years’ War in 
1763.145 By the eighteenth century, the wealth that the Americas produced was in decline, making 
the economic motivation of pirates low as well.146 Meanwhile, the British Empire was willing to 
organize maritime trade networks between its colonies as a key factor to win wars. The Golden 
Age of piracy in the Caribbean ended in the mid-eighteenth century, when the British Empire 
established stable maritime governance using its powerful navy. 
 
The Barbary Coast: The Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries 
 After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the Mediterranean Sea was in a state of 
disarray. Pirates in the Medieval Ages began to dominate the Mediterranean following the collapse 
of the Western Roman Empire. Because many were based on the coastline of North Africa, or the 
Barbary Coast, they were called the Barbary pirates or corsairs. Following the emergence and the 
expansion of the Islamic powers in the Mediterranean in the seventh century, pirates became active 
in response to the rivalry between Muslims and Christians. 
 The competition between European states and the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth 
century enhanced the activities of the corsairs. The Ottoman Empire had occupied most of the 
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Barbary Coast by this time, but the city-states along the coast, such as Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli 
governed the area almost independently of the Ottomans.147 The Barbary pirates mostly targeted 
Christians for slavery and wealth.148 Because permissions for piracy were issued by regencies of 
the city-states, European states had paid tribute to secure their ships from corsair attacks for 
centuries.149 Having engaged in wars constantly with each other, European states were not able to 
unite against the Barbary pirates for a long time. The Concert of Europe, established by the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, gave European states an opportunity to cooperate in suppressing the 
Barbary pirates as a means to abolishing slave trades. 150  With an increasing naval power 
imbalance between the two worlds due to Europe’s technological and institutional advancements, 
the pirates were finally eliminated in the first-half of the nineteenth century.151 
 
Northeast Asia: The Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries 
 Like in the Mediterranean Sea, the history of piracy in Northeast Asia started with the 
history of maritime trade. Pirates in Northeast Asia were armed groups that engaged in both 
plunder and trade, so the distinction between pirates and maritime traders was ambiguous.152 The 
most notable case of piracy in Northeast Asia involves Japanese pirates, or wakō (pronounced 
wokou in Chinese, waegu in Korean, all written as 倭寇). 
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 The rise of the first phase of wakō began in the late thirteenth century when the political 
powers of Japan, China, and Korea were all in decline.153 The pirates were mostly from the island 
of Kyushu where the central military regime of Japan (bakufu) was not fully controlling.  
Throughout the fourteenth century, both Korea and China insisted that Japan eliminate the wakō.154 
In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the wakō was suppressed after the third shogun Ashikaga 
Yoshimitsu secured a trade relationship with Ming China which conditioned the Ashikaga bakufu 
to contain piracy.155 Ming also used force to suppress wakō along the coast of China.156 
 The second wave of wakō came in the sixteenth century. Unlike the first wave, pirates of 
this period were mostly Chinese merchants while Japanese and Portuguese mariners joined in 
small numbers.157 Again, none of the major political powers in Northeast Asia was willing to, or 
capable of, controlling the seas, and thus pirates flourished.158 With Ming’s increasing attention 
to maritime governance after the relaxation of its maritime ban policy and the rise of Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi as a leader in Japan, the wakō gradually became inactive in Northeast Asia by the 
beginning of the seventeenth century.159 Although Japan, China, and Korea established diplomatic 
relationships to contain piracy, they did not clearly establish collective maritime governance. 
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Maritime governance in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries Northeast Asia was thus distinctive 
from other examples of collective hegemony. 
 Having briefly introduced the well-known historical episodes of piracy in the world 
history of the two and a half millennia, I now zero in on the three cases, representing three distinct 
dynamics of the prosperity and downfall of piracy. The first case describes the suppression of 
piracy under single hegemony, while the second case represents the suppression under collective 
hegemony. The third case provides an unusual example of collective hegemony. 
 
Case 1: The Ancient Mediterranean 
Introduction 
 The maritime history of the Mediterranean Sea between the third and first centuries BCE 
corresponds with the rise of the Roman Republic as a regional hegemon. Under the chaotic political 
environment of the Mediterranean, both pirates and privateers continued to raid merchant 
vessels.160 Pirates also attacked undefended coastal towns and villages which provided them with 
slaves and supplies to trade at markets in larger cities.161 Rome’s attempt to establish its own 
maritime governance started with the hegemonic wars between the surrounding powers on both 
sides of the Mediterranean. 
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The Roman Republic’s Steps to the Hegemony 
 In the eastern Mediterranean, Rhodes was taking a leading role in policing piracy by the 
third century BCE, when the Romans had not shown much interest in the area yet.162 The Romans 
extended their sphere of influence in the east by increasing their military activities in Greece for 
the first time in 229 BCE.163 At the beginning, the Romans formed an alliance with the Rhodians, 
but the islanders lost their capability to manage the sea when the Romans stripped important 
economic centers from them by the mid-second century BCE.164 The Romans did not replace 
Rhodes in policing piracy, and piracy flourished in the eastern Mediterranean in response to the 
power vacuum of the area.165 One of the reasons the Romans allowed for piracy during the second 
century BCE was that pirates helped to keep Hellenistic states weak, preventing a rise of new 
competitors.166 When the Roman Republic was not yet a hegemonic power of the region, it used 
piracy as a tool to win the power struggle. 
 In the western Mediterranean, Carthage existed as a major maritime power by the third 
century BCE. The Carthaginians originally held an advantage over the Romans in maritime 
competitions because of their tradition of trade between their territories on both sides of the 
Mediterranean.167 Beginning in 264 BCE, Rome and Carthage collided three times to contest for 
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the hegemony, and Carthage finally fell in 146 BCE at the end of the Third Punic War.168 As a 
result of Rome’s development of its naval fleet, the Romans were able to project their power across 
the Mediterranean and occupy the city of Carthage in North Africa. 169 The Roman Republic 
assured its hegemony over the Mediterranean with the collapse of Carthage, and the Romans 
defeated all opposition powers by the mid-second century BCE. However, it would take more time 
and strenuous efforts to rein in pirates. 
 Even though the single hegemony of the Roman Republic ended external rivalries, the 
Republic was not able to allocate enough power to suppress pirates due to internal conflicts in the 
late second century BCE. Meanwhile, maritime trades within the region increased because a 
common law and currencies due to Rome’s maritime dominance made trades more efficient.170 In 
response to the growth of maritime trade without sufficient governance, pirates expanded their 
activity in the eastern Mediterranean. In fact, intensified piracy attacks gradually cut off the sea 
lane between Rome and wheat producing regions of the eastern Mediterranean, causing a food 
shortage in the capital with a population of one million.171 The senatorial government around this 
time was not capable of upholding its willingness to set an effective measure to suppress piracy.172 
 The pirates that plundered the grain trade were known as the Cilician pirates. Their 
homelands included not only Cilicia on the Mediterranean side of Asia Minor, but also Crete, 
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Cyprus, and the Greek island of Delos.173 The Roman Republic sent its first military troops to 
suppress the Cilician pirates in 102 BCE.174 The campaign of Marcus Antonius the Orator showed 
some success but was not enough to eliminate the pirates from the Mediterranean.175 With a fear 
of losing access to grain, the people in Rome insisted that the Republic suppress piratical activities. 
 
Suppression of Piracy by Pompey the Great 
 After the competition with other powers, no one but the Romans was left to take 
leadership in establishing stable maritime governance over the Mediterranean. In 100 BCE, the 
Roman Republic explicitly showed the necessity of suppressing piracy on the law lex de provinciis 
praetoriis.176 By labeling all opposing maritime powers as both pirates and enemies of the Roman 
people and their allies, Rome justified its combat with various seafaring peoples around the 
Mediterranean.177 In 67 BCE, the Roman senate passed the law lex Gabinia, which rewarded 
Pompey the Great with the power to exercise authority over the entire Mediterranean as a 
provincial governor.178 The amount of power that was granted to Pompey was unusual because 
the Roman Republic had prevented the concentration of power to an individual by developing a 
complicated institutional structure of checks and balances.179 The approval of such an unusual law 
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indicated a strong pressure and concern from the public to solve the food shortage in Rome.180 
 With an authority to command all Roman military leaders and allies, Pompey quickly 
eliminated pirates from the Mediterranean. Pompey concentrated his resources to combat piracy, 
including 500 ships and 120,000 men, to the western side first.181 He blocked the Bosporus and 
the Strait of Gibraltar so that no one could escape from the Mediterranean.182 Then he divided the 
entire Mediterranean into thirteen areas, assigning a squadron to each to ensure pirates were 
completely eliminated from all areas.183 After clearing the western Mediterranean in forty days, 
Pompey moved his military to Cilicia, to which many pirates had fled.184 Pompey reported that 
his force destroyed 120 pirate bases, killed 10,000 pirates, and destroyed 500 ships.185 
 Pompey’s success in eliminating piracy was largely due to his mercy and an astute 
cooperation policy. The Greek biographer Plutarch noted that Pompey did not execute pirates if 
they surrendered, even though he strictly punished pirates who refused to surrender.186 Pompey 
understood that the reasons for plunder mostly came from socio-economic problems, so he took a 
policy to integrate former pirates into the terrestrial economy. He first occupied important coastal 
bases of the Cilician pirates before providing fertile lands away from the coast mostly in Asia 
Minor.187 Many pirates voluntarily surrendered to Pompey and settled in other places as farmers 
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who did not threaten Rome’s maritime governance.188 Although Pompey’s success in suppressing 
piracy was remarkable, it was largely shaped by his strategic calculation on the power struggle 
over domestic politics. Under competitive politics of the Roman Republic, his main goal was to 
produce results as quickly as possible to gain personal power and prestige.189 Pompey’s political 
ambitions and his effective counter-piracy measures resulted in a complete defeat of piracy in the 
Mediterranean. 
 
Conclusion 
 Under the single hegemony of the Roman Republic, pirates were eliminated from the 
ancient Mediterranean by the mid-first century BCE. When the Romans were preoccupied with 
the political struggle with other powers such as Carthage, pirates flourished in the Mediterranean. 
Once the Roman Republic became the sole power that was capable of establishing maritime 
governance, it was determined to suppress pirates unilaterally. Pompey the Great’s military 
campaign in 67 BCE was so successful that pirates were defeated within months. Single hegemony 
can achieve a desired outcome quickly when it has sufficient resources and effective strategy to 
implement a counter-piracy policy. Maritime governance under single hegemony is distinctive 
from maritime governance under collective hegemony in terms of its speed and efficiency, a 
trajectory to which this thesis now turns to, using the Barbary Coast as a case for illustration. 
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Case 2: The Barbary Coast 
Introduction 
 The collapse of the Western Roman Empire meant the end of maritime governance as the 
Romans had established it. Mariners again started to seek economic gains by raiding ships and 
coastal towns in response to the lack of policing forces in and around the Mediterranean. However, 
their activities were not intense because the level of maritime trade in the Medieval Ages was low. 
When European city-states gained economic power as major maritime traders of the Mediterranean, 
pirates also increased their activities.190  
 The Barbary pirates in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries can be divided into two 
chronological phases. The first phase was characterized by the bipolarity between the Ottoman 
Empire and Spain. The two expanding powers collided in the central Mediterranean, and state-
sponsored corsairs as well as pirates flourished, as they were part of maritime competitions.191 
With the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and Spain as dominating powers over the sea in 
the late sixteenth century, the Barbary piracy entered the second phase. The corsairs were 
supported by the local regencies in the Barbary Coast instead of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
rivalry among major European powers around the Mediterranean continued.192 Very complex 
international relations therefore stimulated the activity of the Barbary pirates. 
 This case reveals the complexity and difficulty of suppressing piracy under collective 
hegemony. Until European states managed to cooperate under a shared interest in eliminating 
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piracy from the Mediterranean in the early nineteenth century, sometimes these states attempted 
to attack pirates independently, and in other times they even supported corsair activities. As the 
power dynamics of states in both sides of the Mediterranean continued to change, the Barbary 
pirates exploited the lack of multilateral actions for stable maritime governance as an opportunity 
for piratical activities. 
 
The Hegemonic Competition between the Ottoman Empire and Spain 
 The rivalry between the Ottoman Empire and Spain began in the end of the fifteenth 
century when both states attempted to expand their territories. Following the reconquest of the 
Iberian Peninsula by the Spanish, the Muslim pirates targeted Christian European ships and coastal 
towns.193 The attacks gradually increased both in frequency and intensity as the Ottoman Empire 
sponsored piratical activities. At the same time, Christian pirates, with the support of European 
states, attacked Muslim vessels as well.194 Pirates used galley ships requiring a large number of 
rowers, so one of the main targets of pirates were slaves from the adversary communities. At the 
same time, the Ottomans sought to strengthen their naval power by recruiting highly skilled 
mariners from pirate communities. 195  As the ideological and territorial antagonism between 
Muslim and Christian powers heightened in the central Mediterranean, these powers used both 
naval forces and pirates for the maritime competition. 
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 Sovereign navies and pirates were in fact hard to distinguish in the sixteenth century. One 
of the most notable Barbary pirates, the Barbarossa Brothers, gained a patronage from the Ottoman 
Empire for their plunder against Christians. 196  In 1534, Istanbul appointed Khayraldin, the 
younger brother, as the grand admiral of the Imperial fleet, and successfully expelled the Spanish 
from Tunis.197 With an effective use of corsairs, the Ottomans took a lead in the competition 
throughout the sixteenth century by controlling the key islands of the Mediterranean.198 
 The Battle of Lepanto in 1571 was a turning point for the naval advantage of the Ottoman 
Empire. Since the late 1560s, Christian forces attempted to gather their forces to counterattack 
Muslims.199 With a successful collective action, the Holy League defeated the Ottoman fleet in 
the battle in 1571, resulting in a huge loss of the Ottoman Empire’s naval power. 200  The 
disagreement within the Christian force, however, failed to suppress the Muslim corsairs from the 
Barbary Coast. On one hand Spain wanted to continue the battle by invading North Africa and 
eliminating piratical communities, on the other hand the Pope and the Venetians planned to move 
eastwards, so that the Venetians could secure their colonies in the eastern Mediterranean.201 At the 
same time, the French continued to support the Ottomans through diplomacy to disturb Spain and 
Rome.202 With the collapse of multilateral actions in Europe, pirates continued to flourish in the 
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Mediterranean.  
 Moreover, with the loss of the Ottoman fleets, Istanbul lost its capacity and interest in 
governing the western Mediterranean. 203  The Empire appointed lifelong deys (provincial 
regencies) to Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in 1587, making the regencies along the Barbary Coast 
highly independent from Istanbul.204 Neither the Ottoman Empire nor European states had interest 
in ensuring stable maritime governance under the competitive political environment. The increased 
autonomy in the regencies during the seventeenth century brought the Barbary piracy into a new 
phase. 
 
The Hegemonic Competition among European States 
 Competition between European states nurtured an environment where pirates flourished. 
The constant warfare between Christian states made them use the Barbary pirates as a tool to 
intercept the economic activities of their adversaries. At one point states sold weapons to pirates 
or recruited them as a naval force, and in other times they attacked pirates as enemies.205 Because 
Spain did not have naval supremacy to lead the Christian forces by the seventeenth century, each 
state acted based on its own national interest instead of the collective good. 
 European states tried to avoid attacks from the Barbary pirates individually by negotiating 
peace treaties with the regencies. European states ensured the safety of their ships by paying 
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tributes to the deys because it was cheaper than going to war with the Barbary pirates.206 Moreover, 
states tried to protect their own ships, while also hoping that the ships of other rivals would be 
attacked.207 By the eighteenth century, major Europeans such as the British, the French, the Dutch, 
the Spanish, and the Venetians concluded treaties with the deys of the Barbary Coast and paid 
tributes, which maintained somewhat stable relations between European states and the Barbary 
corsairs.208 In the 1780s, Britain paid £1,000 every year to Algiers, which is approximately £1.2 
million today, while the Dutch paid £24,000 and the Spanish £120,000.209 No state was willing to 
take the initiative to establish stable maritime governance while power competitions continued. 
 The Barbary pirates continued to capture Europeans as slaves even after the European 
states secured peace treaties with the deys. About 1.25 million Christians were captured by coastal 
raids between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.210 Some slaves were treated reasonably so 
that pirates could raise ransoms, while others were assigned hard labor like rowing galley ships.211 
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Christian slavery and ransom payments 
became a key issue that motivated Europeans to eliminate the Barbary pirates. 
 
Suppression of Piracy by European States 
 The technological imbalance between Christians and Muslims in the late seventeenth 
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century started to alter the balance of power between the two. Until the early seventeenth century, 
the Ottomans and the regencies of the Barbary Coast maintained parity with Europeans by 
continuously importing naval technology and organizational structures.212 Europe’s supremacy 
over the Islamic World by the end of the seventeenth century made the corsair attacks less 
successful because state capacity in Europe improved significantly during that century.213 The 
English, the Dutch, and the French used their warships to attack the regencies as well as to protect 
merchant vessels in the Mediterranean.214 With an increased capacity of Europe’s warships, states 
began to question the necessity of paying tributes to the deys each year by the eighteenth century.  
 The first nation that took actions to change the circumstance was the United States. Since 
its declaration of independence in 1776, the United States was no longer under the protection of 
the British navy. The American vessels were thus threatened from the attacks of pirates.215 As an 
ambassador to France, Thomas Jefferson proposed to establish a counter-piracy coalition among 
the West in 1784, but European states continued to pay tribute, under the assumption that tribute 
was less expensive than multilateral military actions.216 After the United States had established a 
sufficient naval force under the Jefferson administration, it launched unilateral military action 
against Tripoli in 1801 to demand the abolition of its tributary system.217 With its victory in the 
Second Barbary War of 1815, the Americans were dismissed from paying tribute to the 
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regencies. 218  The United States’ action in the Barbary Coast led to a destabilization of the 
Christian-Muslim relation in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 The end of the Barbary pirates came in the first half of the nineteenth century under the 
collective hegemony of Europe over the Islamic World. The first movement to suppress the 
Barbary pirates was raised by the English Admiral Sidney Smith in 1814.219 In his “Memorandum 
on the Necessity and Means of Ending the Piracy of the Barbary States,” Smith argued that the 
European governments should “commit themselves by means of treaties among themselves to 
provide their contingent with a combined Naval and amphibian force which … would constantly 
protect the coasts of the Mediterranean and perform the important task of pursuing and arresting 
all pirates, on land and sea.”220 Witnessing the United States’ victory over the regencies, Britain 
began to move away from the tributary system. 
 The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 created an environment where the European 
states were capable to take multilateral action under the Concert of Europe. The devastating effects 
of the war on maritime trade made states realize the necessity of establishing stable maritime 
governance in the Mediterranean. By emphasizing the humanitarian problem of the issue, Christian 
enslavement by the corsairs was unanimously condemned at the Congress of Vienna.221 In 1816, 
the Anglo-Dutch squadron under Lord Exmouth visited Algiers to explain the decisions made at 
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the Congress to ban slavery and piracy.222 The dey refused to accept the demands at the beginning, 
but accepted them after the European naval fleet bombarded and destroyed the city. 223 At the 
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, Britain and France agreed to enter the Alliance of Powers, 
and became responsible for suppressing the corsairs under the European League.224 Because of a 
clear difference between European states in coalition and small regencies along the Barbary Coast 
in terms of military power, the regencies lost equality in negotiation. The regencies lost their 
independence in the end when the French occupied Algiers in 1830.225 Codifying privateering as 
illegal, the 1856 Declaration of Paris was signed by France, Britain, Russia, Prussia, Austria, 
Sardinia, and Ottoman.226 With an increased maritime trade and an increased monopolization of 
use of force by sovereign states, privateering as a tool of war became unnecessary by the mid-
nineteenth century. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Barbary pirates were finally suppressed when European states shared national 
interests under the Congress of Europe. For three centuries, European states were in competition 
with one another and not interested in forming a coalition against the corsairs. As Keohane points 
out as a general theory, a multilateral action was only possible after the end of manmade disasters, 
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in this case, the devastating Napoleonic Wars in 1815.227 Once European states began to share a 
common identity as members of Western civilization, they were finally successful in eliminating 
the corsairs of the Islamic World as collective hegemony over the Mediterranean. The Barbary 
piracy case shows the difficulty of suppressing piracy under collective hegemony. The leading 
powers can establish stable maritime governance in coalition, when these powers have a common 
enemy and a shared interest to suppress it. 
 
Case 3: Northeast Asia 
Introduction 
 The beginning of piracy in Northeast Asia was as old as maritime trade itself. The earliest 
record of piracy in the region went back to the Han Dynasty of China (206 BCE – 220), and the 
cyclical trend of piratical activities had resonated with each regime’s capability of establishing 
stable maritime governance over the surrounding seas. 228  Like other times, the regimes of 
Northeast Asia in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries were often preoccupied with internal 
conflicts. The Japanese pirates, or wakō, thus exploited this opportunity to thrive. 
 The wakō is an ambiguous category. They were pirates, merchants, smugglers, and 
mercenaries.229 They were not limited to Japanese people but were extremely diverse. Wakō not 
only raided and destroyed the coastline communities of China, Japan, and Korea, but they also 
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took a leading role in enhancing the maritime connectivity of East Asia. There are two major waves 
of wakō: the first was in the fourteenth and the early-fifteenth centuries, and the second was 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. When central regimes were weakened and 
various powers were in competition, wakō increased their activities. Once central regimes were 
capable and interested in establishing maritime governance, they managed to suppress pirates. 
 Unlike in the Mediterranean, none of the states in pre-modern Northeast Asia was willing 
to occupy and control the entire seas of Northeast Asia. Instead, the Chinese empires, which were 
the dominating powers of the region, historically coexisted without intense competitions over 
thalassocracy with other states such as Japan and Korea. In other words, each state maintained its 
own sphere of influence without expansion for most of the history in Northeast Asia, although 
some exceptions did exist. 230  Piratical activities, however, mainly occurred when the power 
dynamics were destabilized within a state. Under an internal conflict, central regimes were not 
able to show superiority of their naval force over other maritime actors like pirates. When the 
central regimes were experiencing piracy, it was not eliminated by a coalition of these states even 
though China, Japan, and Korea established diplomatic relations in order to suppress pirates. 
Rather, each state established maritime governance independently after central regimes 
consolidated their political power as hegemon of China, Japan, and Korea. 
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The First Wave of Wakō: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries 
 In the beginning of the fourteenth century, all of China, Japan, and Korea were 
experiencing political instability. In Japan, the balance of power between a samurai military regime 
(bakufu) in Kamakura and the emperor and aristocrats in Kyoto had collapsed by 1333. 231 
Moreover, the new Ashikaga bakufu in Japan was not capable of settling the Northern and Southern 
Court conflicts of the Japanese emperors throughout the fourteenth century.232 The Mongolian 
Yuan Dynasty in China was falling apart, and its tributary state, the Koryo Korea, was also 
experiencing a political crisis.233 
 China’s maritime ban policy encouraged the activity of the wakō as smugglers. After the 
collapse of the Yuan China, Zhu Yuanzhang established the Ming Empire in 1368 and implemented 
a system of tributary trade as the only recognized one in the coast of China.234 The maritime ban 
policy in 1371 intended to segregate the Chinese people in coastal regions from various maritime 
powers by making private maritime activities illegal.235 However, Ming failed to fully implement 
the policy because it did not consider the increased mercantile activities in China as a further need 
for an organized maritime trade.236 Witnessing Ming’s lack of interests in maritime governance, 
merchants and local elites encouraged the wakō as smugglers to respond the increased demand for 
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trade. In fact, the wakō activities intensified especially around the mid-fourteenth century.237 The 
wakō extended their activity by engaging in both violence and smuggling while Ming China paid 
much attention to its governance ashore. 
 Within Japan, some local military lords rose as autonomous maritime powers and engaged 
in trade and piracy. Identifying them as “sea lords,” Shapinsky argues that they developed an 
independent political and cultural realm by positioning themselves as pirates, security guards, and 
toll collectors at the choke points of maritime transportation.238 Continued internal conflicts had 
created an environment where sea travelers became dependent on protections by the sea lords.239 
Major sea lords such as the Murakami extended their activities beyond the archipelago, and their 
reputations as powerful armed protectors as well as pirates reached China and Korea, confirming 
the Chinese and Korean perceptions of wakō as exclusively Japanese. 240  Throughout the 
fourteenth century, the Ashikaga bakufu was not capable of governing all of Japan, and the long-
running competition between the Northern and Southern Courts of the emperors led to conflicts 
between various warlords all over the archipelago. 
 China and Korea insisted that Japan take a leading role in suppressing the wakō in 
Northeast Asia. Koryo Korea sent an envoy in 1367 to Ashikaga Yoshiakira, the shogun at the time, 
but the bakufu in Kyoto replied that it was not capable of sending its military troops to Kyushu, 
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where most of the pirates settled their bases.241 In fact, Dazaifu in Kyushu, the traditional agency 
of Japan’s foreign policy, was under control of the Southern Court, an opposing power of the 
bakufu as well as the Northern Court.242 Moreover, Prince Kaneyoshi, the governor in Dazaifu 
and the son of the Southern Court’s Go-Daigo Emperor, sent an envoy to the Chinese emperor and 
was appointed as the “king of Japan” in 1371.243 Because Prince Kaneyoshi tried to build his 
legitimacy as the governor of Kyushu island by using the title he attained from Ming, the bakufu’s 
necessity of subjugating Kyushu became urgent.244 The bakufu was not able to respond to China’s 
and Korea’s requests to suppress wakō as a legitimate central authority of Japan for the most of 
the fourteenth century. 
 The end of the first wave of the wakō came in the beginning of the fifteenth century when 
the third shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu consolidated his authority in Japan. In 1392, he settled the 
six-decade-long conflicts between the Northern and Southern Courts and unified the throne of the 
Japanese Emperor. After sending captured pirates and promising the elimination of the wakō with 
Ming, Yoshimitsu was appointed as the “king of Japan” in 1401 by the Jianwen Emperor of China 
after he retired from shogun.245 With an appointment of Yoshimitsu as the “king of Japan,” the 
bakufu formally attained a monopolized right to trade with China.246 The wakō and sea lords were 
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incorporated as the subordinate of the bakufu and were no longer able to engage in piratical 
activities.247 Once the bakufu was willing and capable of managing official maritime trade under 
its strong military power by the beginning of the fifteenth century, the wakō ebbed from Northeast 
Asia. The suppression of piracy taken by Japan, China, and Korea were somewhat independent 
from each other, although diplomatic communication for suppressing pirates was evident. 
 
The Second Wave of Wakō: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
 The second wave of the wakō rose in the beginning of the sixteenth century in response 
to the weakened power of the Ashikaga bakufu and the increased maritime trade between Northeast 
Asian communities. Since Ashikata Yoshimitsu was recognized as the legitimate “king of Japan” 
in the beginning of the fifteenth century, Japan and China maintained a peaceful relationship with 
state-sponsored trade as its basis.248 However, the bakufu’s ability to extend power over the entire 
archipelago started to diminish with the beginning of the Ōnin War in 1467, a decade-long conflict 
among the Ashikaga shogun, imperial family members, aristocrats, and feudal lords. 249  The 
internal conflicts from the late-fifteenth century brought the rise of regional warlords all over Japan, 
and some warlords in the western Japan began their own trade with Chinese merchants by 
patronizing pirates and sea lords.250 One of the most powerful sea lords of the time, the Murakami, 
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made a huge profit and expanded its sphere of influence by protecting warlords at sea as well as 
by raiding coastal communities.251 The use of violence was no longer the privilege of the central 
authority, so regional powers relied on armed mariners, or the wakō, for various maritime affairs. 
 Even though the official, state-sponsored trade relationship between China and Japan 
became disorganized, trade itself grew in scale throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Because China allowed only central authorities to engage in trade, smuggling increased especially 
after the entrance of the Iberian traders in the 1520s.252 The smugglers, who were typically armed, 
strengthened maritime networks that connected Kyushu, the Ryukyus, China, and Southeast Asia 
by trading silver, silk, cotton cloth, and guns, among others.253 The Ming’s lack of interest in 
establishing stable maritime governance around the China seas, due to the threat of Mongolians 
and Manchus at its northern border, motivated a large population of the coastal Chinese to join 
bands of the wakō for economic opportunities. 254  Moreover, Japanese warlords in Kyushu 
provided a safe haven for the wakō in return for economic advantages over their rivals in the 
eastern Japan.255 By the mid-sixteenth century, some Chinese wakō leaders like Wang Zhi and Xu 
Hai had established their own maritime networks connecting Japan, China, and Southeast Asia.256 
Thus, the wakō became active in the sixteenth century in response to an increased demand for 
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international trade which central authorities did not have the capability to manage.  
 As more centralized states gained monopolized authority to use forces in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, the wakō bands and other maritime powers gradually disappeared. Until 
the mid-sixteenth century, the Ming government expected surrounding states to sponsor infrequent 
trades, and Ming did not take an active role in managing maritime trade. In 1567, however, Ming 
relaxed its maritime ban policy and legalized private trade for Chinese merchants.257 Ming’s new 
policy contributed to reduced smuggling, and thus the demand for the wakō bands decreased 
significantly.258 The Ming government not only started to get involved in managing maritime trade, 
but also to send military troops to actively suppress pirates along the coastline of China.259 
 With Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s successful pursuit of unification in the last two decades of 
the sixteenth century, the century-long political fragmentation in Japan came to an end. As the 
central political power of Japan, the Toyotomi regime established its own maritime governance by 
changing the political conditions in Japan. The wakō gradually lost support from warlords as they 
were incorporated as vassals of the Toyotomi regime.260 Once Hideyoshi subjugated warlords in 
Kyushu in 1587, the sea lords completely lost ports settled as hubs for their activities.261 Major 
sea lords like the Murakami gradually lost autonomous control of the sea after being taken into the 
service of local lords as reputable naval groups. 262  After stabilizing political and economic 
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positions of sea lords as the subordinates of landlords, Hideyoshi issued a ban on pirates in 1588.263 
Like Pompey the Great, Hideyoshi ensured sea lords and wakō bands could maintain their life 
through legitimate ways so that they would not relay on piratical acts any more. The process of 
suppressing the second wave of the wakō in Japan was thus somewhat similar to that of the Roman 
Republic, as both were the single hegemon of their respective regions. 
 Although Ming vigorously sent troops to suppress pirates in the late-sixteenth century, the 
wakō activities gradually increased along the Chinese coast as the Ming Empire lost its power in 
the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Ming government was in fact preoccupied with the 
rise of the Manchus, and it had once again lost the capability of fully controlling the Chinese coast 
by the 1620s.264 The focus of wakō activities had moved further south to the coast of Fukien and 
Kwangtung, and connectivity of the wakō with Japanese sea lords diminished as the distance 
increased significantly.265 Zheng Zhilong and his half-Japanese son, Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), 
had achieved a private maritime organization by managing wakō bands.266 Their group dominated 
the maritime trade in the China seas until 1683, when the Manchurian Qing Dynasty defeated the 
Zheng and its kingdom in Taiwan.267 As the Qing Empire consolidated its hegemony in China, 
the wakō was finally eliminated from the seas of Northeast Asia. 
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Conclusion 
 The suppression of the wakō is a very rare case due to the unique political environment 
of Northeast Asia. There were no powers which competed to dominate the entire region, and there 
was no clear coalition for establishing maritime governance over the seas of Northeast Asia. Rather, 
a hegemonic power of each state took leadership to suppress piracy from its surrounding seas. The 
first wave of the wakō saw a diplomatic communication between China, Japan, and Korea to solve 
the problem collectively, whereas the complete eliminations of wakō in the late-sixteenth century 
Japan and in the seventeenth century China were similar to that of a single hegemon. The wakō 
case provides diversity in the types of international systems that have historically existed, while it 
still indicates that the capability of establishing stable maritime governance determines the 
prosperity of pirates. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to provide an explanation of the spatial and temporal variations 
of maritime piracy. My theory was that those variations are determined by the capability of 
establishing maritime governance. In other words, a state or an international system does not 
observe a significant level of piratical attacks in its surrounding seas if it has a sufficient ability 
and willingness to design, agree on, and implement counterpiracy policies. Capacity to do so, 
therefore, distinguishes a state that does not experience frequent attacks from a state that does, and 
an international system that does not allow pirates to flourish from other system that allows. 
The spatial variation of piracy is explained using the concept of “sea power” to capture 
the capability of establishing maritime governance at the state level. The Sea Power Index 
quantifies state capacity of 121 coastal states by combining four components: geographic 
characteristics, government quality, military capacity, and economy. The descriptive statistics in 
Chapter 4 visually represent the general trend of contemporary piracy between 1995 and 2015 in 
relation to the sea power of each state. Although the numerical analysis in this thesis does not infer 
a statistical significance of the trend, the graphs presented illustrate that the frequency of piratical 
attacks tends to be high in states with medium levels of sea power compared to states at either end 
of the sea power spectrum, which matches with my hypothesis. The findings suggest that having 
a prominent level of state capacity is necessary to combat piracy. Governments are thus required 
to establish sufficient maritime governance over the surrounding seas to make mariners consider 
pirating a costly choice both economically and politically. 
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The temporal variation of piracy in history is determined by the capability of the 
hegemonic power in a particular period. With an introduction of major historical episodes of piracy, 
the case study chapter examined how different forms of hegemony maintained maritime 
governance at the international level. All cases showed that pirates prospered when hegemonic 
powers were absent, or incapable of and did not pay attention to, the establishment of maritime 
governance, but pirates were brought to ruin from the region once the leading powers were 
determined to have established stable maritime governance. At the same time, this thesis 
discovered that hegemony under a single dominating power and hegemony under a collection of 
leading powers had different processes to suppress piracy. The single hegemonies under the Roman 
Republic and the Toyotomi regime in Japan, for example, were much faster and more efficient in 
eliminating pirates than the collective hegemony of European states in the early-modern 
Mediterranean. My findings contribute to the literature describing the general conditions in which 
piracy rises and falls. 
My theory is applicable to explaining the temporal variation of contemporary piracy in 
the Strait of Malacca and Somalia as well. The piratical activities in these regions increased 
significantly in the 1990s because the collapse of the Somali government in 1991 and the Asia 
Financial Crisis in 1998 made maintaining maritime governance less prioritized.268 The relative 
decline of the United States as the hegemon and the end of the Cold War weakened the necessity 
of the United States to maintain itself as the dominant sea power and the defender of the 
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international security. Although a variety of international organizations are making an effort to 
combat piracy in these regions since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the collective action 
for establishing stable maritime governance is still a long-term process. 
My arguments and findings have implications for future research and policy. It would, for 
example, be interesting to examine potential impacts of the geopolitical change occurring in the 
Arctic Ocean to piracy. The Arctic in the winter of 2017 had “less sea ice at winter’s end than ever 
before in nearly four decades,” implying an opening of new maritime corridors.269 In fact, a trade 
route between Europe and East Asia through the Northern Sea Route (NSR) has a 40 percent 
shorter distance than sailing through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal, and the use of the 
NSR for container cargo shipping could be commercially feasible in the near future.270 
Such geopolitical change in the Arctic has two possible impacts on piracy. First, vessels 
could avoid sailing through choke points where piratical attacks are currently frequent, which 
potentially leads to a decrease in the number of global piracy incidents.271 Meanwhile, piracy 
could emerge in the Arctic coastal regions in response to the increased shipping activities up north. 
Like the Strait of Malacca or the Horn of Africa, some key choke points such as the Bering Strait 
limit an access to the ocean. Because all ships must go through a narrow corridor, pirates have less 
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difficulty in pointing target ships. If states and the international community are not able to establish 
sufficient maritime governance in the Arctic, the security environment of the Arctic Ocean will be 
destabilized. Though not a central issue in my thesis, Arctic governance is an interesting topic to 
develop the study of piracy and maritime governance even further. 
Piracy is a universal crime, but it has been suppressed by some states in certain periods. 
Piracy flourished in other places at other times. The difference lies in the capability of establishing 
maritime governance. Maritime security will be repeatedly threatened if state capacity does not 
grow. Maritime governance, a process of ruling the surrounding seas, is an important aspect to 
explaining the security environment of the seas. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Summary of Each Component (1), 1995-2015 
Country Geographic Characteristics Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
Albania 60.74 36.36 21.79 28.50 
Algeria 4.55 28.02 63.68 54.35 
Angola 14.46 9.24  46.82 
Argentina 21.07 42.80 41.83 67.78 
Australia 35.95 94.73 63.89 89.14 
Bahrain 97.93 67.37 52.48 62.82 
Bangladesh 40.91 23.63 33.32 32.55 
Belgium 23.55 90.71 24.08 91.63 
Benin 12.81 38.63 14.35 12.97 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.72 33.33 42.17 36.85 
Brazil 7.85 50.41 63.21 71.93 
Cambodia 30.17 16.35 55.22 20.05 
Cameroon 7.02 16.93 26.52 24.27 
Canada 72.31 95.44 51.14 89.95 
Cape Verde 98.76 63.51  21.83 
Chile 54.13 86.57 62.01 69.46 
China 18.60 46.80 76.83 70.59 
Colombia 31.82 43.78 62.34 56.89 
Comoros 95.45 10.40  7.14 
Congo 5.37 9.89 65.65 30.13 
Costa Rica 74.79 66.09  51.90 
Cote d’Ivoire 20.25 15.54 35.22 31.35 
Croatia 92.98 61.89 40.63 61.13 
Cuba 79.75 32.35 53.61 44.39 
Cyprus 86.36 84.89 68.26 54.09 
Denmark 96.28 98.81 38.82 86.66 
Djibouti 62.40 21.58 93.48 14.69 
Dominican Republic 76.45 33.78 12.61 48.55 
  
Country Geographic Characteristics Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
DR Congo 0.41 2.34 21.17 11.26 
Ecuador 88.02 23.18 49.87 48.11 
Egypt 29.34 42.14 66.68 46.81 
El Salvador 64.05 38.62 15.22 37.67 
Equatorial Guinea 56.61 5.70 51.74 51.14 
Eritrea 71.49 12.92 51.03 4.18 
Estonia 91.32 80.54 49.13 60.72 
Fiji 84.71 39.77 45.65 28.94 
Finland 40.08 99.14 28.26 82.88 
France 47.52 89.86 79.98 91.19 
Gabon 36.78 32.47 43.04 43.17 
Gambia 52.48 35.53 10.00 5.87 
Germany 46.69 92.75 53.79 93.29 
Ghana 28.51 53.25 6.52 28.41 
Greece 93.80 72.29 76.00 72.83 
Guatemala 37.60 23.42 4.78 41.41 
Guinea 15.29 10.69 62.17 9.62 
Guinea-Bissau 59.09 8.35 50.00 4.20 
Guyana 26.86 42.68 47.39 22.23 
Haiti 85.54 5.08 1.30 10.88 
Honduras 48.35 24.26 20.43 33.46 
India 27.69 55.00 82.19 53.00 
Indonesia 78.10 36.51 36.32 56.40 
Iran 19.42 28.85 60.89 60.63 
Iraq 1.24 4.66 38.82 58.14 
Ireland 69.01 91.86 7.39 85.81 
Israel 59.92 82.65 58.06 76.59 
Italy 75.62 69.18 69.22 89.10 
Jamaica 92.15 51.65 8.26 36.88 
Japan 88.84 88.41 55.13 95.39 
Jordan 2.07 60.86 94.35 41.42 
Kenya 9.50 28.81 38.70 26.73 
  
Country Geographic Characteristics Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
Kuwait 77.27 61.49 96.09 74.94 
Latvia 51.65 70.90 23.91 54.87 
Lebanon 70.66 39.90 90.87 50.25 
Liberia 44.21 9.29 10.87 4.17 
Libya 10.33 12.87 48.28 59.44 
Lithuania 16.94 72.28 14.37 60.29 
Madagascar 53.31 30.62 21.30 9.18 
Malaysia 63.22 72.69 45.60 72.33 
Mauritania 6.20 28.68 78.70 17.17 
Mauritius 90.50 77.33 2.17 38.57 
Mexico 41.74 49.66 29.44 78.19 
Montenegro 69.83 55.06 54.35 35.23 
Morocco 39.26 51.39 49.40 46.41 
Mozambique 33.47 32.56 16.96 11.69 
Myanmar 32.64 4.81 74.35 22.98 
Namibia 22.73 59.85 76.09 35.20 
Netherlands 61.57 96.39 53.42 94.56 
New Zealand 83.88 96.19 33.39 72.02 
Nicaragua 50.00 25.12 5.65 24.70 
Nigeria 8.68 12.98 11.29 46.36 
North Korea 67.36 4.83 69.17 17.08 
Norway 89.67 98.02 50.85 88.33 
Oman 45.87 65.24 98.70 64.90 
Pakistan 16.12 27.44 77.08 37.99 
Panama 78.93 55.62 18.70 51.49 
Papua New Guinea 58.26 26.13 9.13 27.21 
Peru 21.90 38.64 57.88 52.28 
Philippines 94.63 48.04 21.39 50.55 
Poland 17.77 70.54 50.96 74.46 
Portugal 66.53 83.66 56.87 74.91 
Qatar 82.23 71.15 64.78 80.83 
Russia 73.14 31.22 92.45 75.26 
  
Country Geographic Characteristics Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
Saudi Arabia 13.64 53.83 75.16 79.48 
Senegal 30.99 47.26 40.43 17.57 
Sierra Leone 43.39 12.37 44.78 5.43 
Singapore 99.59 95.38 59.55 87.45 
Slovenia 25.21 81.03 30.00 68.66 
Solomon Islands 97.11 24.81  16.37 
Somalia 42.56 0.20 0.43 6.30 
South Africa 26.03 64.45 21.68 64.81 
South Korea 73.97 79.78 76.29 85.33 
Spain 55.79 85.44 58.50 85.76 
Sri Lanka 68.18 52.50 83.91 39.30 
Sudan 2.89 7.15 84.78 27.60 
Sweden 50.83 97.85 39.37 88.74 
Syria 11.98 22.16 54.69 33.86 
Taiwan 81.40 80.38 78.75 87.08 
Tanzania 65.70 38.57 23.04 17.12 
Thailand 45.04 59.53 51.07 65.62 
Timor 80.58 16.32 79.57 9.23 
Togo 11.16 14.57 53.48 7.52 
Trinidad and Tobago 87.19 59.42 3.91 56.98 
Tunisia 49.17 57.54 46.52 47.68 
Turkey 54.96 58.07 80.56 71.10 
United Arab Emirates 64.88 73.42 58.79 86.62 
United Kingdom 83.06 93.52 77.77 93.30 
United States 24.38 91.40 92.41 97.90 
Uruguay 38.43 69.50 40.63 51.54 
Venezuela 34.30 11.80 37.45 65.68 
Vietnam 57.44 41.19 44.40 47.59 
Yemen 35.12 13.47 92.61 28.01 
  
  
Table A.2 Summary of Each Component (2), 1995-2001, 2002-2008, 2009-2015 
Country Geography 
Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
96-00 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 
Albania 60.74 23.43 33.75 44.52 20.86 42.41 43.58 23.88 29.10 29.10 
Algeria 4.55 14.10 31.59 30.41 59.91 57.81 64.89 53.58 55.38 54.13 
Angola 14.46 6.44 7.79 11.90    32.72 46.13 50.34 
Argentina 21.07 56.62 41.46 38.23 42.92 39.51 38.35 72.35 62.57 67.21 
Australia 35.95 94.44 94.86 94.73 63.01 63.17 66.67 84.68 84.47 90.81 
Bahrain 97.93 66.93 67.80 67.11 52.38 48.88 49.64 61.77 62.31 62.73 
Bangladesh 40.91 26.73 21.92 24.02 31.80 29.69 36.47 33.53 31.35 33.44 
Belgium 23.55 90.06 91.07 90.62 27.16 20.31 19.26 91.91 91.59 90.75 
Benin 12.81 48.71 39.08 33.87 5.19 16.52 20.64 12.77 13.87 13.02 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.72 23.74 30.95 39.82  56.70 27.98 31.94 40.39 36.61 
Brazil 7.85 50.18 48.87 52.07 64.13 62.28 59.71 74.86 68.39 73.03 
Cambodia 30.17 16.56 14.49 18.12 73.11 20.98 51.83 14.44 20.94 22.20 
Cameroon 7.02 15.48 16.86 17.61 24.06 28.13 30.73 25.11 26.48 21.85 
Canada 72.31 94.62 95.57 95.65 53.86 48.44 50.56 91.05 91.16 92.02 
Cape Verde 98.76 71.95 61.01 62.94    22.63 23.25 20.72 
Chile 54.13 85.84 86.71 86.75 66.28 63.17 62.73 68.09 67.22 70.58 
China 18.60 42.11 45.82 49.78 71.85 77.90 79.19 61.57 67.39 75.01 
Colombia 31.82 34.89 42.18 49.19 60.28 60.49 60.71 59.12 56.26 58.80 
Comoros 95.45 10.27 11.25 9.60    9.83 8.05 5.50 
Congo 5.37 8.73 8.90 11.38 54.25 63.84 81.19 25.55 29.88 29.43 
Costa Rica 74.79 68.29 64.45 66.79    54.91 51.30 52.17 
Cote d’Ivoire 20.25 29.11 8.62 16.65 10.85 39.73 48.17 34.01 32.30 29.33 
Croatia 92.98 51.39 61.64 66.64 46.88 29.69 28.20 60.46 61.85 58.90 
Cuba 79.75 24.98 30.42 37.44 25.83 84.38 83.94 45.57 44.19 43.36 
Cyprus 86.36 83.42 84.68 85.73 83.49 54.02 56.42 57.55 55.68 50.67 
Denmark 96.28 97.15 99.55 98.78 43.80 36.83 36.83 89.40 86.23 86.23 
Djibouti 62.40 18.48 23.73 20.77 88.21 95.98  14.94 14.79 13.95 
Dominican Republic 76.45 37.77 32.30 33.55 11.79 11.16 8.72 52.77 48.77 45.42 
DR Congo 0.41 1.74 2.48 2.45 17.45 23.66 23.39 9.75 10.84 13.34 
  
Country Geography 
Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
96-00 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 
Ecuador 88.02 32.02 19.68 22.90 38.18 49.78 54.41 47.23 47.04 49.14 
Egypt 29.34 47.63 46.97 34.96 66.25 71.65 60.85 48.89 44.42 46.95 
El Salvador 64.05 28.41 40.57 41.05 20.28 13.84 17.89 43.85 38.69 33.65 
Equatorial Guinea 56.61 7.20 5.59 5.15 63.68 38.84 52.75 23.88 51.85 53.12 
Eritrea 71.49 24.14 15.95 5.09 51.01 99.55  5.10 3.77 5.03 
Estonia 91.32 72.04 81.47 83.25 22.17 53.13 63.76 52.38 60.19 59.77 
Fiji 84.71 49.59 46.91 28.42 41.04 50.45 42.66 34.54 31.66 26.61 
Finland 40.08 98.21 99.24 99.42 29.72 26.34 38.99 83.86 83.69 81.59 
France 47.52 89.96 90.61 89.06 81.03 78.79 79.75 93.60 91.56 91.13 
Gabon 36.78 38.13 32.24 30.27 48.58 41.52 46.33 46.89 45.54 42.15 
Gambia 52.48 42.39 37.54 30.57 3.30 7.59 35.32 14.09 6.33 3.37 
Germany 46.69 93.41 92.43 92.77 54.41 51.56 54.26 96.16 93.65 93.66 
Ghana 28.51 51.50 53.63 53.63 8.02 4.91 5.96 21.24 24.30 32.69 
Greece 93.80 78.05 75.35 66.76 76.36 74.78 72.19 74.49 74.01 70.24 
Guatemala 37.60 28.38 23.59 21.11 13.68 4.02 2.29 42.13 41.57 39.04 
Guinea 15.29 12.76 11.73 8.75 47.64 72.77 72.02 14.89 9.66 10.49 
Guinea-Bissau 59.09 6.15 10.23 7.41 27.83 51.34 64.68 2.99 4.64 4.65 
Guyana 26.86 45.54 41.74 42.39 31.60 59.38 37.16 21.75 21.54 23.65 
Haiti 85.54 7.87 4.38 4.59 0.47   14.06 11.35 11.33 
Honduras 48.35 24.79 26.31 21.99 9.91 12.05 36.24 34.45 34.85 31.49 
India 27.69 58.09 55.51 53.17 81.61 82.81 82.93 46.68 52.24 55.60 
Indonesia 78.10 31.08 33.78 41.55 42.11 33.71 30.29 56.07 54.44 57.38 
Iran 19.42 31.37 29.26 27.35 58.56 58.26 63.70 56.55 61.25 62.52 
Iraq 1.24 3.10 2.20 7.80 4.17 62.95 80.28 57.20 52.01 57.49 
Ireland 69.01 91.78 91.57 92.18 12.74 5.80 4.13 85.55 87.90 84.54 
Israel 59.92 83.02 81.45 83.68 57.46 55.13 55.55 77.48 75.25 74.86 
Italy 75.62 79.18 68.47 65.61 68.62 68.53 67.87 90.62 89.46 88.20 
Jamaica 92.15 51.00 51.56 52.01 6.13 8.48 15.14 44.74 40.87 30.79 
Japan 88.84 86.44 87.54 90.13 54.50 56.03 56.74 98.73 93.67 92.40 
Jordan 2.07 60.17 61.01 61.01 94.81 95.09 95.87 40.86 40.75 42.41 
Kenya 9.50 26.97 26.45 31.95 30.66 45.98 47.25 25.92 23.45 27.64 
  
Country Geography 
Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
96-00 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 
Kuwait 77.27 62.41 63.78 58.81 96.70 92.41 87.61 72.39 75.73 76.15 
Latvia 51.65 62.14 70.43 75.12 8.96 46.88 22.48 44.73 56.42 57.66 
Lebanon 70.66 47.89 41.96 34.42 89.15 91.52 93.12 55.80 50.51 48.80 
Liberia 44.21 1.47 8.10 13.84  10.27 12.39 4.24 4.17 3.75 
Libya 10.33 15.91 15.99 8.44 58.72 31.92 27.68 64.29 62.65 55.49 
Lithuania 16.94 64.89 71.88 75.84 14.03 13.62 9.37 51.51 61.42 61.84 
Madagascar 53.31 34.85 40.45 18.99 25.94 21.88 9.63 11.04 9.62 9.19 
Malaysia 63.22 69.31 73.79 73.04 44.90 45.76 40.63 75.70 73.85 71.35 
Mauritania 6.20 44.93 32.30 18.11 72.17 80.80 78.44 15.35 16.00 16.83 
Mauritius 90.50 73.65 77.84 78.40 2.36 0.45 1.38 45.17 41.34 37.56 
Mexico 41.74 49.16 50.37 49.17 29.21 27.01 27.10 80.81 78.48 74.66 
Montenegro 69.83 43.69 52.42 58.27  64.73 53.67 44.87 35.04 31.71 
Morocco 39.26 57.06 49.62 50.73 41.83 49.33 52.26 49.75 46.56 43.61 
Mozambique 33.47 34.78 34.51 29.67 21.23 14.73 16.97 9.77 11.71 14.21 
Myanmar 32.64 6.09 3.41 5.65 69.34 47.77 88.53 13.99 15.45 26.80 
Namibia 22.73 62.00 58.65 60.13 60.85 73.66 86.70 37.08 34.16 35.38 
Netherlands 61.57 97.23 95.72 96.70 58.07 52.46 48.87 94.04 94.54 94.11 
New Zealand 83.88 94.67 95.09 97.93 40.21 28.35 26.07 74.08 72.36 71.12 
Nicaragua 50.00 29.50 25.09 23.28 7.08 6.70 7.80 25.99 23.57 23.97 
Nigeria 8.68 12.78 12.99 13.05 15.23 11.38 6.54 36.91 44.36 50.67 
North Korea 67.36 8.53 5.19 2.88 62.50 66.96 68.75 19.92 17.08 18.75 
Norway 89.67 98.20 97.63 98.33 53.59 46.21 49.05 88.55 88.33 87.91 
Oman 45.87 66.89 65.48 64.30 98.58 98.66 99.54 63.87 64.38 66.04 
Pakistan 16.12 29.70 30.09 23.82 79.27 72.10 70.56 41.19 38.91 37.24 
Panama 78.93 56.17 53.92 57.09 19.34   46.45 49.23 55.52 
Papua New Guinea 58.26 34.81 24.20 24.33 23.11 3.13 3.21 27.66 24.81 26.92 
Peru 21.90 43.04 35.00 40.41 64.54 45.76 53.89 51.48 49.11 54.16 
Philippines 94.63 50.41 46.35 48.72 28.99 17.63 16.68 55.24 50.24 46.91 
Poland 17.77 74.43 66.89 72.53 49.57 52.01 49.27 70.62 74.74 73.89 
Portugal 66.53 86.00 83.71 82.61 56.45 51.56 53.78 75.76 75.65 72.30 
Qatar 82.23 64.14 68.04 77.28  70.98 58.26 67.74 79.57 83.32 
  
Country Geography 
Government Quality Military Capacity Economy 
96-00 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 95-01 02-08 09-15 
Russia 73.14 24.86 30.52 34.65 90.02 91.29 93.84 67.16 75.94 78.05 
Saudi Arabia 13.64 50.91 51.35 57.55 70.90 74.33 74.76 77.44 79.80 80.22 
Senegal 30.99 52.63 49.65 42.57 37.26 40.63 49.08 22.13 21.43 17.21 
Sierra Leone 43.39 7.36 11.96 14.93 66.51 44.20 14.22 2.56 4.61 7.14 
Singapore 99.59 93.68 94.98 96.52 48.11 56.03 63.82 88.09 85.70 90.78 
Slovenia 25.21 81.84 80.67 81.04 28.77 37.95 31.65 68.12 69.41 66.90 
Solomon Islands 97.11 36.37 18.52 26.36    22.63 13.95 15.21 
Somalia 42.56 0.36 0.33 0.00   0.46   2.12 
South Africa 26.03 68.30 64.38 62.86 26.66 19.42 26.02 65.08 64.63 64.62 
South Korea 73.97 73.10 80.23 82.21 73.89 76.56 79.82 84.65 84.40 86.92 
Spain 55.79 90.35 86.20 82.57 62.93 55.13 59.66 85.52 86.95 84.43 
Sri Lanka 68.18 51.52 54.24 51.17 86.32 79.91 74.77 39.53 36.50 39.45 
Sudan 2.89 6.90 7.10 7.30 65.57 90.63 92.20 17.85 28.92 29.40 
Sweden 50.83 96.51 97.74 98.53 49.32 35.04 23.80 91.09 90.38 87.05 
Syria 11.98 25.33 24.44 18.52 58.18 49.78 6.25 40.40 41.11 32.92 
Taiwan 81.40 74.37 79.52 83.81 83.14 76.56 76.56 88.56 87.92 86.25 
Tanzania 65.70 40.09 42.01 34.47 35.38 17.41 18.81 13.17 15.90 19.68 
Thailand 45.04 64.33 60.84 56.18 55.76 43.53 52.16 67.59 63.71 64.98 
Timor 80.58 23.30 20.42 11.18  83.48 77.52 20.09 5.92 9.30 
Togo 11.16 22.48 11.70 14.05 62.74 49.55 57.34 8.94 7.97 9.23 
Trinidad and Tobago 87.19 64.64 58.99 57.60 1.42 2.23 10.55 54.54 58.95 56.44 
Tunisia 49.17 55.83 61.22 54.59 44.81 35.27 54.59 53.18 49.57 45.34 
Turkey 54.96 50.75 58.54 60.75 84.30 77.90 73.91 67.20 72.21 71.78 
United Arab Emirates 64.88 74.99 70.34 75.83 58.80 56.47 60.45 85.57 86.60 85.29 
United Kingdom 83.06 94.82 93.50 92.97 78.81 79.69 80.62 94.46 94.53 90.72 
United States 24.38 91.86 91.72 90.89 87.56 93.08 95.20 98.29 97.46 97.04 
Uruguay 38.43 69.65 68.55 70.40 45.81 38.62 35.39 54.97 45.08 53.93 
Venezuela 34.30 26.78 10.70 6.47 44.52 38.62 34.03 65.95 66.78 65.97 
Vietnam 57.44 38.61 40.17 43.31 34.17 44.42 42.68 36.49 43.06 51.47 
Yemen 35.12 16.10 15.79 10.01 91.98 94.20 94.04 25.50 29.35 28.09 
  
  
Table A.3 Geographic Characteristics 
Country Coastline (in km) Land Area (in km2) Coastline-Land Area Ratio  
Albania 362 27400 0.0132 
Algeria 998 2381740 0.0004 
Angola 1600 1246700 0.0013 
Argentina 4989 2736690 0.0018 
Australia 25760 7682300 0.0034 
Bahrain 161 740 0.2176 
Bangladesh 580 130170 0.0045 
Belgium 66.5 30890 0.0022 
Benin 121 110620 0.0011 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 20 51187 0.0004 
Brazil 7491 8459420 0.0009 
Cambodia 443 176520 0.0025 
Cameroon 402 472710 0.0009 
Canada 202080 9093510 0.0222 
Cape Verde 965 4030 0.2395 
Chile 6435 743810 0.0087 
China 14500 9569900 0.0015 
Colombia 3208 1138910 0.0028 
Comoros 340 2240 0.1518 
Congo 169 341500 0.0005 
Costa Rica 1290 51060 0.0253 
Cote d’Ivoire 515 318000 0.0016 
Croatia 5835 55970 0.1043 
Cuba 3735 109820 0.0340 
Cyprus 648 9240 0.0701 
Denmark 7314 42430 0.1724 
Djibouti 314 23180 0.0135 
Dominican Republic 1288 48320 0.0267 
DR Congo 37 2267050 0.0000 
Ecuador 2237 27684 0.0808 
  
Country Coastline (in km) Land Area (in km2) Coastline-Land Area Ratio  
Egypt 2450 995450 0.0025 
El Salvador 307 20720 0.0148 
Equatorial Guinea 296 28050 0.0106 
Eritrea 2234 101000 0.0221 
Estonia 3794 42390 0.0895 
Fiji 1129 18270 0.0618 
Finland 1250 303820 0.0041 
France 4668 640050 0.0073 
Gabon 885 257670 0.0034 
Gambia 80 10000 0.0080 
Germany 2389 348670 0.0069 
Ghana 539 227530 0.0024 
Greece 13676 130650 0.1047 
Guatemala 400 107160 0.0037 
Guinea 320 245720 0.0013 
Guinea-Bissau 350 28120 0.0124 
Guyana 459 196850 0.0023 
Haiti 1771 27560 0.0643 
Honduras 820 111890 0.0073 
India 7000 2973190 0.0024 
Indonesia 54716 1811570 0.0302 
Iran 2440 1531600 0.0016 
Iraq 58 437370 0.0001 
Ireland 1448 68880 0.0210 
Israel 273 21640 0.0126 
Italy 7600 294140 0.0258 
Jamaica 1022 10830 0.0944 
Japan 29751 364490 0.0816 
Jordan 26 88800 0.0003 
Kenya 536 569140 0.0009 
Kuwait 499 17820 0.0280 
Latvia 498 62250 0.0080 
  
Country Coastline (in km) Land Area (in km2) Coastline-Land Area Ratio  
Lebanon 225 10230 0.0220 
Liberia 579 96320 0.0060 
Libya 1770 1759540 0.0010 
Lithuania 90 62680 0.0014 
Madagascar 4828 581540 0.0083 
Malaysia 4675 328660 0.0142 
Mauritania 754 1030700 0.0007 
Mauritius 177 2030 0.0872 
Mexico 9330 1943950 0.0048 
Montenegro 293.5 13810 0.0213 
Morocco 1835 446300 0.0041 
Mozambique 2470 786380 0.0031 
Myanmar 1930 653510 0.0030 
Namibia 1572 823290 0.0019 
Netherlands 451 33890 0.0133 
New Zealand 15134 267710 0.0565 
Nicaragua 910 119990 0.0076 
Nigeria 853 910770 0.0009 
North Korea 2495 120410 0.0207 
Norway 25148 304280 0.0826 
Oman 2092 309500 0.0068 
Pakistan 1046 770880 0.0014 
Panama 2490 74340 0.0335 
Papua New Guinea 5152 452860 0.0114 
Peru 2414 1280000 0.0019 
Philippines 36289 298170 0.1217 
Poland 440 304260 0.0014 
Portugal 1793 91470 0.0196 
Qatar 563 11590 0.0486 
Russia 37653 1633770 0.0230 
Saudi Arabia 2640 2149690 0.0012 
Senegal 531 192530 0.0028 
  
Country Coastline (in km) Land Area (in km2) Coastline-Land Area Ratio  
Sierra Leone 402 71620 0.0056 
Singapore 193 690 0.2797 
Slovenia 46 20150 0.0023 
Solomon Islands 5313 27990 0.1898 
Somalia 3025 627340 0.0048 
South Africa 2798 1214470 0.0023 
South Korea 2413 96920 0.0249 
Spain 4964 498980 0.0099 
Sri Lanka 1340 64630 0.0207 
Sudan 853 2376000 0.0004 
Sweden 3218 410340 0.0078 
Syria 193 183630 0.0011 
Taiwan 1566 32260 0.0485 
Tanzania 1424 88580 0.0161 
Thailand 3219 510890 0.0063 
Timor 706 14900 0.0474 
Togo 56 54390 0.0010 
Trinidad and Tobago 362 5130 0.0706 
Tunisia 1148 155360 0.0074 
Turkey 7200 769630 0.0094 
United Arab Emirates 1318 83600 0.0158 
United Kingdom 12419 241930 0.0513 
United States 19924 9161970 0.0022 
Uruguay 660 175020 0.0038 
Venezuela 2800 882050 0.0032 
Vietnam 3444 310070 0.0111 
Yemen 1746 527970 0.0033 
Source: CIA “The World Fact Book”  
  
  
Table A.4 Government Quality: Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness 
Country 
Rule of Law (in Percentile Rank) Government Effectiveness (in Percentile Rank) 
1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 
Albania 22.32 29.54 41.04 33.00 24.54 37.95 48.00 39.72 
Algeria 12.31 29.24 24.96 24.49 15.89 33.94 35.86 31.54 
Angola 2.67 6.12 10.03 7.12 10.20 9.45 13.77 11.36 
Argentina 51.43 29.94 28.67 33.21 61.81 52.97 47.79 52.39 
Australia 96.01 95.17 95.46 95.44 92.87 94.54 94.00 94.02 
Bahrain 59.21 67.49 64.21 64.68 74.65 68.11 70.01 70.05 
Bangladesh 21.13 19.88 23.77 21.70 32.32 23.96 24.27 25.56 
Belgium 88.35 88.88 89.23 88.93 91.76 93.26 92.01 92.48 
Benin 51.27 38.80 32.71 38.49 46.15 39.35 35.03 38.77 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 34.97 36.41 47.12 40.57 12.51 25.48 32.51 26.08 
Brazil 44.93 43.67 53.76 48.04 55.42 54.06 50.37 52.78 
Cambodia 14.47 10.92 14.96 13.21 18.64 18.05 21.28 19.48 
Cameroon 11.80 12.23 14.97 13.28 19.15 21.49 20.25 20.57 
Canada 94.51 95.23 95.60 95.26 94.72 95.91 95.70 95.61 
Cape Verde 77.39 64.90 67.66 68.24 66.50 57.11 58.21 58.77 
Chile 86.02 88.39 88.08 87.84 85.66 85.03 85.41 85.30 
China 34.78 35.37 39.48 36.96 49.44 56.27 60.08 56.63 
Colombia 26.63 34.34 44.96 37.35 43.14 50.02 53.42 50.21 
Comoros 15.50 17.08 16.87 16.72 5.04 5.41 2.32 4.07 
Congo 8.68 9.61 11.44 10.20 8.78 8.19 11.32 9.58 
Costa Rica 70.88 66.63 66.98 67.52 65.70 62.26 66.60 64.65 
Cote d’Ivoire 19.83 6.09 18.08 13.45 38.39 11.15 15.22 17.63 
Croatia 41.21 54.80 61.83 55.29 61.57 68.48 71.44 68.48 
Cuba 17.30 18.51 29.25 22.72 32.66 42.33 45.63 41.98 
Cyprus 81.02 83.06 83.95 83.07 85.81 86.29 87.51 86.71 
Denmark 97.84 99.45 98.92 98.95 96.46 99.65 98.63 98.67 
Djibouti 21.79 23.11 24.55 23.47 15.16 24.34 16.98 19.69 
Dominican Republic 34.12 31.34 31.17 31.76 41.42 33.25 35.93 35.80 
DR Congo 0.83 2.55 2.24 2.12 2.65 2.40 2.66 2.55 
  
Country 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 
Ecuador 33.63 21.12 12.39 19.73 30.41 18.24 33.40 26.63 
Egypt 50.92 51.55 39.78 46.59 44.33 42.39 30.13 37.68 
El Salvador 26.11 35.45 30.35 31.70 30.70 45.69 51.74 45.54 
Equatorial Guinea 6.34 6.97 6.82 6.80 8.05 4.20 3.48 4.59 
Eritrea 33.60 18.50 5.14 15.66 14.67 13.40 5.04 10.18 
Estonia 70.04 82.05 85.78 81.47 74.03 80.89 80.71 79.61 
Fiji 53.14 45.86 28.02 39.80 46.03 47.96 28.81 39.74 
Finland 99.66 99.24 99.73 99.52 96.76 99.23 99.11 98.75 
France 91.35 89.90 89.57 90.02 88.56 91.31 88.55 89.69 
Gabon 38.57 36.34 36.88 36.96 37.68 28.14 23.66 27.98 
Gambia 48.77 44.17 32.74 40.28 36.00 30.90 28.40 30.77 
Germany 93.68 94.26 92.56 93.46 93.14 90.60 92.98 92.03 
Ghana 47.88 53.13 56.89 53.75 55.12 54.13 50.36 52.75 
Greece 79.54 76.50 65.88 72.66 76.56 74.19 67.63 71.91 
Guatemala 19.28 14.72 15.64 15.91 37.48 32.45 26.58 30.92 
Guinea 8.15 9.17 5.56 7.51 17.37 14.29 11.93 13.86 
Guinea-Bissau 4.31 10.03 5.29 7.07 7.99 10.42 9.53 9.63 
Guyana 41.45 35.22 36.40 36.81 49.62 48.26 48.38 48.55 
Haiti 6.34 3.84 7.19 5.66 9.40 4.91 1.98 4.49 
Honduras 20.30 21.48 16.60 19.26 29.28 31.13 27.38 29.26 
India 62.56 56.77 53.97 56.64 53.61 54.24 52.36 53.35 
Indonesia 29.96 25.58 35.64 30.50 32.20 41.98 47.45 42.51 
Iran 27.58 23.94 16.64 21.58 35.15 34.57 38.05 36.11 
Iraq 5.32 1.81 3.80 3.25 0.87 2.59 11.79 6.07 
Ireland 92.85 92.81 94.64 93.57 90.71 90.32 89.71 90.14 
Israel 84.71 77.66 80.38 80.03 81.33 85.23 86.98 85.26 
Italy 79.38 67.19 63.99 68.03 78.97 69.74 67.22 70.33 
Jamaica 42.10 42.75 43.55 42.97 59.89 60.36 60.47 60.33 
Japan 89.03 87.54 88.49 88.19 83.84 87.53 91.76 88.62 
Jordan 63.06 60.98 63.80 62.51 57.27 61.03 58.22 59.21 
Kenya 20.11 20.87 26.12 22.90 33.82 32.03 37.78 34.71 
Kuwait 68.55 67.28 63.08 65.78 56.27 60.27 54.53 57.20 
  
Country 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 
Latvia 58.73 69.24 74.36 69.50 65.54 71.62 75.88 72.30 
Lebanon 43.25 37.48 26.66 34.04 52.53 46.43 42.18 45.76 
Liberia 0.67 10.14 19.16 12.18 2.27 6.05 8.52 6.40 
Libya 16.13 17.81 10.12 14.35 15.69 14.16 6.75 11.38 
Lithuania 64.74 69.10 75.51 70.97 65.04 74.65 76.16 73.58 
Madagascar 38.75 42.77 23.80 34.25 30.95 38.12 14.17 26.99 
Malaysia 62.24 63.90 66.31 64.60 76.38 83.67 79.76 80.77 
Mauritania 36.43 27.69 19.51 25.86 53.42 36.90 16.70 31.49 
Mauritius 81.19 81.92 78.74 80.48 66.11 73.76 78.06 74.18 
Mexico 34.08 40.02 36.37 37.47 64.24 60.71 61.96 61.85 
Montenegro 43.69 50.24 56.96 52.36  54.59 59.58 57.76 
Morocco 58.25 48.58 50.33 51.01 55.86 50.66 51.12 51.77 
Mozambique 24.95 32.17 29.15 29.65 44.60 36.84 30.19 35.47 
Myanmar 4.66 2.34 6.10 4.30 7.52 4.47 5.19 5.31 
Namibia 60.73 57.72 60.81 59.52 63.26 59.58 59.44 60.17 
Netherlands 95.51 95.16 97.22 96.07 98.94 96.28 96.18 96.71 
New Zealand 97.68 96.75 98.44 97.61 91.66 93.43 97.41 94.76 
Nicaragua 29.32 28.00 27.14 27.88 29.67 22.17 19.42 22.36 
Nigeria 11.30 9.84 12.67 11.26 14.25 16.14 13.42 14.69 
North Korea 15.30 9.74 4.59 8.60 1.75 0.64 1.16 1.05 
Norway 99.34 98.81 98.91 98.95 97.06 96.45 97.75 97.09 
Oman 66.72 64.25 66.16 65.47 67.06 66.70 62.44 65.01 
Pakistan 26.31 22.20 23.10 23.30 33.09 37.97 24.54 31.58 
Panama 47.59 50.34 52.69 50.82 64.75 57.49 61.49 60.42 
Papua New Guinea 29.97 19.10 20.91 21.76 39.65 29.30 27.75 30.49 
Peru 28.28 32.09 34.27 32.31 57.80 37.91 46.54 44.97 
Philippines 49.79 39.16 39.35 41.11 51.03 53.53 58.08 54.96 
Poland 73.71 65.38 72.80 69.90 75.14 68.40 72.26 71.18 
Portugal 87.37 85.38 83.21 84.84 84.63 82.03 82.01 82.48 
Qatar 57.69 66.44 77.11 69.29 70.58 69.64 77.44 73.01 
Russia 20.82 19.28 26.00 22.32 28.89 41.75 43.30 40.12 
Saudi Arabia 52.77 54.85 59.19 56.27 49.04 47.85 55.91 51.38 
  
Country 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 1996, 98, 00 2002-2008 2009-2015 1996-2015 
Senegal 50.73 50.99 46.48 49.09 54.53 48.30 38.65 45.43 
Sierra Leone 9.99 14.55 20.10 16.03 4.73 9.36 9.75 8.70 
Singapore 87.36 92.18 93.23 91.76 100.00 97.77 99.80 99.00 
Slovenia 85.03 80.74 81.85 81.95 78.65 80.59 80.23 80.10 
Solomon Islands 54.67 25.03 34.80 34.28 18.06 12.00 17.91 15.34 
Somalia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.66 0.00 0.40 
South Africa 58.23 57.39 59.79 58.53 78.37 71.37 65.92 70.36 
South Korea 75.52 79.20 80.91 79.25 70.67 81.26 83.50 80.31 
Spain 90.35 86.26 83.26 85.75 90.35 86.13 81.87 85.12 
Sri Lanka 56.74 58.80 51.54 55.45 46.29 49.68 50.80 49.54 
Sudan 2.50 5.18 8.60 6.11 11.30 9.02 6.00 8.18 
Sweden 96.67 97.58 99.18 98.08 96.34 97.89 97.88 97.61 
Syria 34.10 31.13 17.56 26.07 16.56 17.74 19.48 18.25 
Taiwan 73.37 77.44 82.81 78.93 75.37 81.60 84.81 81.82 
Tanzania 44.44 43.10 39.14 41.71 35.73 40.91 29.79 35.42 
Thailand 67.21 56.06 49.49 55.32 61.45 65.61 62.86 63.74 
Timor 23.30 23.53 11.37 18.49  17.31 10.98 14.14 
Togo 27.45 19.29 20.12 21.07 17.51 4.11 7.98 8.07 
Trinidad and Tobago 66.39 55.12 51.13 55.47 62.89 62.85 64.07 63.36 
Tunisia 42.76 53.41 53.70 51.65 68.89 69.03 55.48 63.43 
Turkey 48.58 56.42 56.87 55.22 52.92 60.65 64.62 60.92 
United Arab Emirates 71.71 64.22 67.87 67.04 78.26 76.46 83.79 79.80 
United Kingdom 94.68 93.65 93.84 93.91 94.96 93.35 92.10 93.12 
United States 92.68 92.13 91.19 91.84 91.03 91.30 90.59 90.96 
Uruguay 68.71 67.79 71.05 69.29 70.59 69.31 69.75 69.71 
Venezuela 26.62 7.63 1.01 8.26 26.93 13.77 11.93 15.34 
Vietnam 38.26 36.76 37.87 37.48 38.95 43.58 48.75 44.89 
Yemen 6.67 11.91 10.15 10.26 25.52 19.67 9.87 16.67 
Source: World Bank “Worldwide Governance Indicators Project” 
  
  
Table A.5 Military Capacity (1): Military Expenditure as a Share of GDP 
Country 
Actual Values (in percentage) Percentile Ranks 
1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Albania 1.40 1.54 1.43 1.46 32.55 42.41 43.58 36.09 
Algeria 3.52 3.09 4.69 3.77 80.66 79.02 94.95 86.52 
Angola         
Argentina 1.22 0.89 0.83 0.98 25.00 15.63 13.30 17.83 
Australia 1.95 1.90 1.84 1.90 55.19 55.80 61.01 56.96 
Bahrain 4.92 3.63 3.93 4.16 87.26 86.16 89.45 89.13 
Bangladesh 1.46 1.19 1.38 1.34 34.43 24.55 39.91 29.13 
Belgium 1.41 1.15 1.03 1.20 33.49 20.09 21.56 25.65 
Benin 0.57 0.90 0.99 0.85 5.19 16.52 20.64 14.35 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1.92 1.15 1.53  56.70 27.98 42.17 
Brazil 1.72 1.54 1.41 1.56 45.75 43.30 41.74 43.91 
Cambodia 2.71 1.16 1.60 1.82 73.11 20.98 51.83 55.22 
Cameroon 1.21 1.29 1.23 1.24 24.06 28.13 30.73 26.52 
Canada 1.26 1.15 1.13 1.18 26.89 19.20 25.23 24.78 
Cape Verde         
Chile 2.59 2.56 2.09 2.41 68.40 71.88 67.43 66.52 
China 1.81 2.03 1.91 1.91 49.53 60.27 62.84 57.83 
Colombia 3.38 3.42 3.33 3.38 79.72 82.59 83.03 82.17 
Comoros         
Congo 1.95 2.11 3.13 2.37 54.25 63.84 81.19 65.65 
Costa Rica         
Cote d’Ivoire 0.82 1.50 1.54 1.43 10.85 39.73 48.17 35.22 
Croatia 5.82 1.92 1.68 3.14 92.92 58.48 55.50 80.43 
Cuba  3.43 3.41 3.42  84.38 83.94 83.04 
Cyprus 3.77 1.89 1.70 2.45 83.49 54.02 56.42 68.26 
Denmark 1.59 1.39 1.27 1.42 40.09 33.48 33.49 33.48 
Djibouti 5.09 5.49  5.29 88.21 95.98  93.48 
Dominican Republic 0.84 0.78 0.65 0.75 11.79 11.16 8.72 12.61 
DR Congo 0.95 1.19 1.06 1.07 17.45 23.66 23.39 22.17 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Ecuador 1.70 2.22 2.89 2.27 43.87 68.30 79.36 63.91 
Egypt 2.94 2.89 1.83 2.55 75.00 78.13 60.09 70.87 
El Salvador 1.00 0.85 0.94 0.93 20.28 13.84 17.89 15.22 
Equatorial Guinea 2.43 1.49 1.62 1.73 63.68 38.84 52.75 51.74 
Eritrea 26.47 20.77  25.20 99.53 99.55  99.57 
Estonia 1.16 1.85 1.92 1.64 22.17 53.13 63.76 49.13 
Fiji 1.61 1.70 1.43 1.58 41.04 50.45 42.66 45.65 
Finland 1.37 1.28 1.37 1.34 29.72 26.34 38.99 28.26 
France 2.68 2.38 2.29 2.45 71.23 69.20 71.10 69.13 
Gabon 1.80 1.51 1.48 1.54 48.58 41.52 46.33 43.04 
Gambia 0.44 0.63 1.29 0.73 3.30 7.59 35.32 10.00 
Germany 1.49 1.32 1.27 1.36 36.32 29.02 34.40 31.74 
Ghana 0.75 0.54 0.57 0.62 8.02 4.91 5.96 6.52 
Greece 3.26 2.78 2.58 2.87 76.89 77.23 73.85 77.83 
Guatemala 0.86 0.53 0.43 0.60 13.68 4.02 2.29 4.78 
Guinea 1.73 2.66 2.35 2.17 47.64 72.77 72.02 62.17 
Guinea-Bissau 1.30 1.72 1.93 1.66 27.83 51.34 64.68 50.00 
Guyana 1.38 1.99 1.32 1.59 31.60 59.38 37.16 47.39 
Haiti 0.09   0.09 0.47   1.30 
Honduras 0.78 0.79 1.30 1.01 9.91 12.05 36.24 20.43 
India 2.84 2.73 2.62 2.73 74.06 75.45 75.69 75.22 
Indonesia 0.95 0.73 0.73 0.80 18.40 9.38 11.47 13.48 
Iran 2.44 2.72 2.58 2.58 64.62 74.55 72.94 72.61 
Iraq  2.08 3.06 2.65  62.95 80.28 73.48 
Ireland 0.84 0.56 0.51 0.64 12.74 5.80 4.13 7.39 
Israel 7.92 7.59 5.97 7.16 95.75 96.88 97.71 96.96 
Italy 1.84 1.80 1.60 1.75 51.42 52.23 50.92 52.61 
Jamaica 0.58 0.64 0.90 0.70 6.13 8.48 15.14 8.26 
Japan 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.94 16.51 18.30 19.72 16.09 
Jordan 5.90 5.47 5.10 5.49 94.81 95.09 95.87 94.35 
Kenya 1.37 1.60 1.51 1.49 30.66 45.98 47.25 38.70 
Kuwait 9.03 4.89 3.76 5.89 96.70 92.41 87.61 96.09 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Latvia 0.76 1.61 1.05 1.14 8.96 46.88 22.48 23.91 
Lebanon 5.09 4.53 4.24 4.62 89.15 91.52 93.12 90.87 
Liberia  0.74 0.74 0.74  10.27 12.39 10.87 
Libya 3.56 1.59  2.41 81.60 45.09  67.39 
Lithuania 0.93 1.17 0.90 1.00 15.57 22.77 16.06 19.57 
Madagascar 1.26 1.16 0.69 1.04 25.94 21.88 9.63 21.30 
Malaysia 2.09 2.18 1.57 1.95 58.96 65.63 50.00 58.70 
Mauritania 2.70 3.23 2.77 2.90 72.17 80.80 78.44 78.70 
Mauritius 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.19 2.36 0.45 1.38 2.17 
Mexico 0.50 0.44 0.60 0.51 4.25 1.34 6.88 3.04 
Montenegro  2.16 1.62 1.82  64.73 53.67 54.35 
Morocco 3.27 3.26 3.45 3.33 77.83 81.70 85.78 81.30 
Mozambique 1.08 0.89 0.94 0.97 21.23 14.73 16.97 16.96 
Myanmar 2.61 1.67 3.80 2.68 69.34 47.77 88.53 74.35 
Namibia 2.20 2.67 3.65 2.84 60.85 73.66 86.70 76.09 
Netherlands 1.61 1.41 1.26 1.43 41.98 36.16 32.57 34.35 
New Zealand 1.67 1.29 1.21 1.39 42.92 27.23 29.82 32.61 
Nicaragua 0.65 0.57 0.62 0.61 7.08 6.70 7.80 5.65 
Nigeria 0.89 0.80 0.54 0.74 14.62 12.95 5.05 11.74 
North Korea         
Norway 2.01 1.68 1.48 1.72 58.02 48.66 45.41 50.87 
Oman 12.39 10.99 12.32 11.90 98.58 98.66 99.54 98.70 
Pakistan 5.26 3.98 3.42 4.22 91.04 87.95 84.86 90.00 
Panama 0.99   0.99 19.34   18.70 
Papua New Guinea 1.21 0.50 0.44 0.72 23.11 3.13 3.21 9.13 
Peru 2.11 1.38 1.41 1.63 59.91 31.70 40.83 48.26 
Philippines 1.84 1.38 1.19 1.47 50.47 32.59 28.90 36.96 
Poland 1.93 1.90 1.86 1.89 53.30 54.91 61.93 56.09 
Portugal 2.00 1.92 1.94 1.95 57.08 57.59 65.60 59.57 
Qatar  2.49 1.75 2.32  70.98 58.26 64.78 
Russia 3.72 3.62 4.00 3.78 82.55 85.27 90.37 87.39 
Saudi Arabia 10.87 8.28 9.45 9.53 97.64 97.77 98.62 97.83 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Senegal 1.50 1.50 1.56 1.52 37.26 40.63 49.08 40.43 
Sierra Leone 2.48 1.58 0.89 1.56 66.51 44.20 14.22 44.78 
Singapore 4.66 4.28 3.30 4.08 85.38 89.73 82.11 88.26 
Slovenia 1.35 1.44 1.23 1.34 28.77 37.95 31.65 30.00 
Solomon Islands         
Somalia   0.00 0.00   0.46 0.43 
South Africa 1.57 1.34 1.13 1.34 39.15 30.80 26.15 30.87 
South Korea 2.64 2.43 2.63 2.57 70.28 70.09 76.61 71.74 
Spain 1.73 1.40 1.32 1.48 46.70 34.38 38.07 37.83 
Sri Lanka 4.86 3.10 2.61 3.52 86.32 79.91 74.77 83.91 
Sudan 2.44 4.50 4.17 3.56 65.57 90.63 92.20 84.78 
Sweden 1.95 1.42 1.14 1.51 56.13 37.05 27.06 39.57 
Syria 5.87 5.09  5.51 93.87 93.30  95.22 
Taiwan 3.37 2.18 2.03 2.53 78.77 66.52 66.51 70.00 
Tanzania 1.47 0.92 0.96 1.12 35.38 17.41 18.81 23.04 
Thailand 1.86 1.24 1.47 1.52 52.36 25.45 44.50 41.30 
Timor  3.43 2.71 2.97  83.48 77.52 79.57 
Togo 2.36 1.68 1.72 1.76 62.74 49.55 57.34 53.48 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.16 0.49 0.71 0.57 1.42 2.23 10.55 3.91 
Tunisia 1.71 1.41 1.64 1.59 44.81 35.27 54.59 46.52 
Turkey 3.78 2.73 2.10 2.87 84.43 76.34 68.35 76.96 
United Arab Emirates 5.16 4.00 5.62 4.86 90.09 88.84 96.79 91.74 
United Kingdom 2.30 2.22 2.17 2.23 61.79 67.41 69.27 63.04 
United States 3.14 3.77 4.11 3.67 75.94 87.05 91.28 85.65 
Uruguay 2.50 2.07 1.81 2.13 67.45 62.05 59.17 60.43 
Venezuela 1.51 1.33 1.12 1.33 38.21 29.91 24.31 27.39 
Vietnam  2.05 2.22 2.14  61.16 70.18 61.30 
Yemen 5.58 5.36 4.65 5.22 91.98 94.20 94.04 92.61 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute “Military Expenditure Database” 
  
  
Table A.6 Military Capacity (2): Total Tonnage of Naval Ships 
Country 
Actual Values (in ton) Percentile Ranks 
1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Albania 1800   1800 9.17   7.50 
Algeria 11059 11952 12994 11768 39.17 36.61 34.82 40.83 
Angola         
Argentina 41787 38474 39497 40019 60.83 63.39 63.39 65.83 
Australia 56368 63018 65318 60686 70.83 70.54 72.32 70.83 
Bahrain 4100 4100 4100 4100 17.50 11.61 9.82 15.83 
Bangladesh 9143 11156 11492 10386 29.17 34.82 33.04 37.50 
Belgium 6233 6297 6640 6338 20.83 20.54 16.96 22.50 
Benin         
Bosnia and Herzegovina         
Brazil 95123 95727 89532 94385 82.50 81.25 77.68 82.50 
Cambodia         
Cameroon         
Canada 86103 83089 82252 84183 80.83 77.68 75.89 77.50 
Cape Verde         
Chile 42551 30840 35262 36443 64.17 54.46 58.04 57.50 
China 278976 354715 437691 338171 94.17 95.54 95.54 95.83 
Colombia 12714 14640 14640 13847 40.83 38.39 38.39 42.50 
Comoros         
Congo         
Costa Rica         
Cote d’Ivoire         
Croatia 175 214 350 225 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.83 
Cuba 6770   6770 25.83   24.17 
Cyprus         
Denmark 16247 15116 16215 15776 47.50 40.18 40.18 44.17 
Djibouti         
Dominican Republic         
DR Congo         
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Ecuador 9418 10000 10000 9760 32.50 31.25 29.46 35.83 
Egypt 35345 40902 38227 38142 57.50 65.18 61.61 62.50 
El Salvador         
Equatorial Guinea         
Eritrea 1150   1150 2.50   2.50 
Estonia         
Fiji         
Finland         
France 228339 170082 174570 194862 90.83 88.39 88.39 90.83 
Gabon         
Gambia         
Germany 64095 67943 79323 68367 72.50 74.11 74.11 75.83 
Ghana         
Greece 70433 65174 65085 67324 75.83 72.32 70.54 74.17 
Guatemala         
Guinea         
Guinea-Bissau         
Guyana         
Haiti         
Honduras         
India 158518 180282 183736 171930 89.17 90.18 90.18 89.17 
Indonesia 42599 36279 26023 37071 65.83 58.04 49.11 59.17 
Iran 20163 15338 26487 19292 52.50 41.96 54.46 49.17 
Iraq 1181   1181 4.17   4.17 
Ireland         
Israel 5700 5700 5700 5700 19.17 13.39 13.39 19.17 
Italy 107411 101097 118831 106827 85.83 84.82 84.82 85.83 
Jamaica         
Japan 273384 305296 312620 293448 92.50 93.75 93.75 94.17 
Jordan         
Kenya         
Kuwait         
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Latvia         
Lebanon         
Liberia         
Libya 10770 6263 8768 8561 35.83 18.75 27.68 29.17 
Lithuania 2140 2140 1070 2064 12.50 4.46 2.68 9.17 
Madagascar         
Malaysia 9305 7983 10555 8981 30.83 25.89 31.25 32.50 
Mauritania         
Mauritius         
Mexico 23870 28944 25267 26206 54.17 52.68 47.32 55.83 
Montenegro         
Morocco 1482 6118 6888 4524 5.83 16.96 18.75 17.50 
Mozambique         
Myanmar         
Namibia         
Netherlands 69283 61626 42032 61321 74.17 68.75 65.18 72.50 
New Zealand 10888 8567 7200 9281 37.50 29.46 22.32 34.17 
Nicaragua         
Nigeria 3766 3360 3360 3527 15.83 9.82 8.04 10.83 
North Korea 42486 52665 54137 48733 62.50 66.96 68.75 69.17 
Norway 18420 17890 26297 19592 49.17 43.75 52.68 50.83 
Oman         
Pakistan 43587 35114 33530 38323 67.50 56.25 56.25 64.17 
Panama         
Papua New Guinea         
Peru 45408 36596 43025 41359 69.17 59.82 66.96 67.50 
Philippines 1620 1620 1620 1620 7.50 2.68 4.46 5.83 
Poland 15454 19046 14449 16756 45.83 49.11 36.61 45.83 
Portugal 23965 18032 16408 20189 55.83 45.54 41.96 54.17 
Qatar         
Russia 1084167 615220 555113 797709 97.50 97.32 97.32 97.50 
Saudi Arabia 14774 21667 26296 19646 44.17 50.89 50.89 52.50 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2011 1995-2011 
Senegal         
Sierra Leone         
Singapore 2100 6686 21600 8571 10.83 22.32 45.54 30.83 
Slovenia         
Solomon Islands         
Somalia         
South Africa 2768 2504 8718 3949 14.17 8.04 25.89 12.50 
South Korea 80171 97547 118103 94020 77.50 83.04 83.04 80.83 
Spain 82228 83018 103804 86361 79.17 75.89 81.25 79.17 
Sri Lanka         
Sudan         
Sweden 13805 10279 7179 11020 42.50 33.04 20.54 39.17 
Syria 6321 2300 2300 3956 22.50 6.25 6.25 14.17 
Taiwan 135020 139885 138724 137677 87.50 86.61 86.61 87.50 
Tanzania         
Thailand 38751 38353 35436 37955 59.17 61.61 59.82 60.83 
Timor         
Togo         
Trinidad and Tobago         
Tunisia         
Turkey 103382 89911 91290 95702 84.17 79.46 79.46 84.17 
United Arab Emirates 6840 7600 7600 7329 27.50 24.11 24.11 25.83 
United Kingdom 291228 251204 190187 256917 95.83 91.96 91.96 92.50 
United States 3043543 2912896 2829670 2952005 99.17 99.11 99.11 99.17 
Uruguay 6690 6053 5203 6133 24.17 15.18 11.61 20.83 
Venezuela 19465 18620 18620 18968 50.83 47.32 43.75 47.50 
Vietnam 9709 8157 5970 8329 34.17 27.68 15.18 27.50 
Yemen 1800   1800 9.17   7.50 
Source: Crisher and Souva “Power at Sea: A Naval Dataset, 1865-2011” 
  
  
Table A.7 Economy (1): GDP per Capita 
Country 
Actual Values (in current US dollars) Percentile Ranks 
1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Albania 1003.28 2778.37 4259.99 2680.55 34.62 41.95 41.95 40.76 
Algeria 1616.04 3124.64 4918.22 3219.63 44.02 46.19 45.34 44.96 
Angola 465.09 1826.51 4140.55 2144.05 20.94 36.02 41.10 36.55 
Argentina 7722.11 5323.40 11831.88 8292.47 74.79 58.90 64.83 66.81 
Australia 21288.04 33544.46 58728.68 37853.73 85.04 86.02 97.03 92.86 
Bahrain 11225.14 17783.24 22664.25 17224.21 77.35 76.69 77.54 76.89 
Bangladesh 384.70 489.88 911.08 595.22 14.10 12.29 13.14 12.18 
Belgium 25515.77 37147.70 45148.77 35937.41 91.88 91.10 90.25 90.34 
Benin 378.85 610.75 836.85 608.81 13.25 14.83 12.29 13.03 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1075.92 3179.75 4846.22 3033.96 38.03 47.03 43.64 43.28 
Brazil 4385.74 5176.25 11176.74 6912.91 67.09 57.20 63.14 62.61 
Cambodia 304.88 500.24 949.53 584.88 8.12 13.14 13.98 11.34 
Cameroon 721.01 1050.39 1411.00 1060.80 25.21 27.54 21.61 24.79 
Canada 22057.38 36005.28 48424.24 35495.64 87.61 89.41 91.95 87.82 
Cape Verde 1265.90 2317.50 3411.26 2331.55 39.74 39.41 36.86 38.24 
Chile 5209.12 7695.76 13950.44 8951.77 69.66 66.53 69.92 71.01 
China 830.74 1995.01 6171.59 2999.11 30.34 36.86 51.27 42.44 
Colombia 2475.12 3506.47 6928.61 4303.40 53.42 51.27 55.51 52.52 
Comoros 427.52 625.88 797.29 616.90 19.23 15.68 10.59 13.87 
Congo 807.62 1687.97 2675.51 1723.70 28.63 35.17 31.78 32.35 
Costa Rica 3572.97 5089.88 9543.46 6068.77 59.40 56.36 60.59 56.72 
Cote d’Ivoire 739.62 955.51 1334.66 1009.93 26.07 25.85 19.92 23.95 
Croatia 5175.00 10607.66 13445.48 9742.71 68.80 71.61 68.22 71.85 
Cuba 2546.88 4083.83 6439.39 4356.70 55.13 52.97 52.97 53.36 
Cyprus 14973.10 25695.72 28919.03 23195.95 80.77 81.78 80.93 81.09 
Denmark 33163.17 49119.28 59031.29 47104.58 97.86 97.03 97.88 97.90 
Djibouti 769.75 944.05 1538.93 1084.25 26.92 25.00 24.15 25.63 
Dominican Republic 2503.31 3568.30 5842.27 3971.29 54.27 52.12 50.42 50.84 
DR Congo 172.86 230.40 405.18 262.70 2.14 1.27 1.27 1.26 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Ecuador 1985.18 3081.63 5494.17 3520.33 46.58 44.49 47.03 46.64 
Egypt 1221.59 1367.44 2987.42 1858.82 38.89 30.93 33.47 34.03 
El Salvador 2035.84 2895.90 3773.83 2901.85 47.44 42.80 38.56 41.60 
Equatorial Guinea 1032.91 10637.23 18126.62 9932.25 36.32 72.46 74.15 72.69 
Eritrea 212.85 277.14 498.56 289.74 3.85 2.12 3.81 2.10 
Estonia 3822.53 11278.25 17202.76 10767.85 61.97 73.31 72.46 73.53 
Fiji 2355.62 3441.86 4378.86 3392.11 52.56 49.58 42.80 45.80 
Finland 25437.47 39866.57 47641.16 37648.40 91.03 92.80 91.10 92.02 
France 24758.04 35182.72 41288.40 33743.06 90.17 86.86 86.02 86.13 
Gabon 4306.28 6727.92 9087.01 6707.07 65.38 64.83 58.05 60.92 
Gambia 686.41 459.00 501.15 548.85 24.36 9.75 4.66 9.66 
Germany 27268.91 35484.22 44327.32 35693.49 93.59 88.56 89.41 88.66 
Ghana 364.28 691.74 1458.86 838.29 11.54 16.53 23.31 18.91 
Greece 13062.10 23245.79 23784.90 20030.93 79.91 80.93 79.24 80.25 
Guatemala 1584.15 2135.21 3287.56 2335.64 43.16 38.56 35.17 39.08 
Guinea 410.96 443.80 676.78 510.51 14.96 8.90 8.90 8.82 
Guinea-Bissau 235.35 426.27 600.40 420.67 4.70 7.20 8.05 7.14 
Guyana 923.67 1562.93 3597.25 2027.95 32.91 34.32 37.71 35.71 
Haiti 422.54 481.73 756.18 553.48 18.38 11.44 9.75 10.50 
Honduras 864.35 1371.62 2107.51 1447.83 31.20 31.78 28.39 30.67 
India 415.74 733.91 1423.79 857.81 15.81 18.22 22.46 19.75 
Indonesia 895.96 1517.29 3326.35 1913.20 32.05 32.63 36.02 34.87 
Iran 1769.60 3462.76 6307.54 3846.63 45.73 50.42 52.12 50.00 
Iraq  2648.70 5620.85 4382.45  41.10 48.73 54.20 
Ireland 23943.02 49868.71 53182.38 42331.37 89.32 97.88 95.34 95.38 
Israel 19567.30 22012.80 33441.47 25007.19 84.19 80.08 82.63 82.77 
Italy 21433.91 32066.75 35273.39 29591.35 85.90 85.17 83.47 84.45 
Jamaica 3018.43 4100.02 4869.99 3996.15 57.69 53.81 44.49 51.68 
Japan 36743.83 36007.52 42165.59 38305.65 99.57 90.25 87.71 93.70 
Jordan 1579.49 2378.82 3857.90 2605.41 42.31 40.25 39.41 39.92 
Kenya 416.05 609.18 1134.86 720.03 16.67 13.98 17.37 16.39 
Kuwait 16904.00 35193.69 42300.42 31466.04 83.33 87.71 88.56 85.29 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Latvia 2927.88 9033.94 13649.95 8537.26 56.84 70.76 69.07 67.65 
Lebanon 5007.22 5731.68 8672.39 6470.43 67.95 61.44 56.36 59.24 
Liberia 131.91 178.61 398.55 236.35 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Libya 6025.61 8201.35 9340.03 7506.40 72.22 68.22 58.90 65.13 
Lithuania 2919.38 8674.68 14148.76 8580.94 55.98 69.92 70.76 68.49 
Madagascar 255.60 319.97 434.79 336.79 6.41 4.66 2.97 2.94 
Malaysia 4068.55 5883.73 9899.61 6617.30 64.53 62.29 61.44 60.08 
Mauritania 541.86 773.54 1277.61 864.34 23.50 19.92 19.07 20.59 
Mauritius 3720.47 5603.92 8979.74 6101.38 61.11 60.59 57.20 57.56 
Mexico 5336.86 8118.75 9466.75 7640.79 71.37 67.37 59.75 65.97 
Montenegro 1768.31 4236.95 6913.41 5099.32 44.87 54.66 54.66 55.88 
Morocco 1423.04 2095.58 2964.85 2161.16 41.45 37.71 32.63 37.39 
Mozambique 250.00 366.18 533.32 383.17 5.56 5.51 5.51 4.62 
Myanmar 166.06 311.70 1094.53 635.98 1.28 3.81 16.53 14.71 
Namibia 2155.30 3309.94 5192.67 3552.64 50.00 48.73 46.19 47.48 
Netherlands 27425.57 42602.63 50533.16 40187.12 94.44 94.49 92.80 94.54 
New Zealand 15893.34 26061.10 37983.40 26645.95 82.48 82.63 84.32 83.61 
Nicaragua 960.55 1199.49 1769.23 1309.76 33.76 28.39 26.69 28.99 
Nigeria 314.62 852.75 2511.72 1226.36 9.83 23.31 30.93 26.47 
North Korea         
Norway 36668.81 67687.42 92142.51 65499.58 98.72 99.58 99.58 99.58 
Oman 7204.53 13213.34 19648.65 13355.51 73.93 75.00 75.00 75.21 
Pakistan 494.28 755.46 1221.75 823.83 21.79 19.07 18.22 18.07 
Panama 3847.06 5184.61 10377.31 6469.66 62.82 58.05 62.29 58.40 
Papua New Guinea 779.83 993.05 2491.81 1421.56 27.78 26.69 30.08 29.83 
Peru 2137.76 2919.14 5778.92 3611.94 48.29 43.64 49.58 48.32 
Philippines 1056.87 1324.04 2481.53 1620.81 37.18 29.24 29.24 31.51 
Poland 4330.72 8556.49 13122.64 8669.95 66.24 69.07 67.37 69.33 
Portugal 11922.15 18986.10 21760.73 17556.33 79.06 78.39 75.85 77.73 
Qatar 21877.04 52529.15 78257.35 50887.85 86.75 98.73 98.73 98.74 
Russia 2154.96 6061.82 12514.74 6910.51 49.15 63.14 65.68 61.76 
Saudi Arabia 8224.81 13563.73 22084.39 14624.31 75.64 75.85 76.69 76.05 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Senegal 521.78 789.16 1022.61 777.85 22.65 21.61 14.83 17.23 
Sierra Leone 184.78 307.43 544.78 345.66 2.99 2.97 6.36 3.78 
Singapore 23796.53 30770.01 51248.58 35271.71 88.46 84.32 93.64 86.97 
Slovenia 10750.62 19027.70 23431.78 17736.70 76.50 79.24 78.39 78.57 
Solomon Islands 1268.07 918.63 1677.78 1288.16 40.60 24.15 25.00 28.15 
Somalia   417.15 417.15   2.12 6.30 
South Africa 3253.63 4875.56 6860.21 4996.46 58.55 55.51 53.81 55.04 
South Korea 11328.27 17988.40 24231.99 17849.55 78.21 77.54 80.08 79.41 
Spain 15316.32 26673.70 29727.52 23905.85 81.62 83.47 81.78 81.93 
Sri Lanka 817.57 1335.01 3253.35 1801.97 29.49 30.08 34.32 33.19 
Sudan 364.48 776.54 1844.22 995.08 12.39 20.76 27.54 23.11 
Sweden 29910.34 43912.63 55040.90 42954.62 96.15 96.19 96.19 97.06 
Syria 1012.31 1553.83  1262.24 35.47 33.47  27.31 
Taiwan         
Tanzania 264.93 438.49 805.48 502.97 7.26 8.05 11.44 7.98 
Thailand 2305.00 3104.05 5509.49 3639.51 51.71 45.34 47.88 49.16 
Timor 441.65 476.43 1023.68 711.51 20.09 10.59 15.68 15.55 
Togo 308.14 374.98 552.04 411.72 8.97 6.36 7.20 5.46 
Trinidad and Tobago 5273.12 12897.44 17950.53 12040.36 70.51 74.15 73.31 74.37 
Tunisia 2208.35 3267.92 4137.44 3204.57 50.85 47.88 40.25 44.12 
Turkey 3591.00 7199.84 11203.53 7331.45 60.26 65.68 63.98 63.45 
United Arab Emirates 29102.61 38706.66 39656.91 35822.06 95.30 91.95 85.17 89.50 
United Kingdom 26523.30 40975.83 42024.49 36507.87 92.74 93.64 86.86 91.18 
United States 33102.39 43853.29 51495.83 42817.17 97.01 95.34 94.49 96.22 
Uruguay 6820.01 5571.28 14250.84 8880.71 73.08 59.75 71.61 70.17 
Venezuela 3966.66 6124.91 12751.26 7357.43 63.68 63.98 66.53 64.29 
Vietnam 362.67 724.32 1704.30 930.43 10.68 17.37 25.85 22.27 
Yemen 421.13 825.50 1400.35 882.33 17.52 22.46 20.76 21.43 
Source: World Bank Open Data 
  
  
Table A.8 Economy (2): Total Merchandise Trade (Exports and Imports Combined) 
Country 
Actual Values (in current US dollars) Percentile Ranks 
1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Albania 1.19E+09 3.72E+09 6.70E+09 3.87E+09 13.14 16.25 16.25 16.25 
Algeria 2.38E+10 6.64E+10 1.08E+11 6.59E+10 63.14 64.58 62.92 63.75 
Angola 7.77E+09 3.75E+10 7.85E+10 4.12E+10 44.49 56.25 59.58 57.08 
Argentina 5.01E+10 7.33E+10 1.32E+11 8.52E+10 69.92 66.25 69.58 68.75 
Australia 1.25E+11 2.40E+11 4.48E+11 2.71E+11 84.32 82.92 84.58 85.42 
Bahrain 8.69E+09 1.97E+10 2.98E+10 1.94E+10 46.19 47.92 47.92 48.75 
Bangladesh 1.29E+10 2.48E+10 5.94E+10 3.24E+10 52.97 50.42 53.75 52.92 
Belgium 3.60E+11 6.64E+11 8.53E+11 6.88E+11 91.95 92.08 91.25 92.92 
Benin 1.11E+09 2.04E+09 4.20E+09 2.45E+09 12.29 12.92 13.75 12.92 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.21E+09 9.99E+09 1.51E+10 9.44E+09 25.85 33.75 29.58 30.42 
Brazil 1.09E+11 2.14E+11 4.25E+11 2.49E+11 82.63 79.58 82.92 81.25 
Cambodia 2.45E+09 7.31E+09 1.59E+10 8.55E+09 20.76 28.75 30.42 28.75 
Cameroon 3.15E+09 6.45E+09 1.05E+10 6.69E+09 25.00 25.42 22.08 23.75 
Canada 4.34E+11 6.73E+11 8.60E+11 6.56E+11 94.49 92.92 92.08 92.08 
Cape Verde 2.48E+08 5.35E+08 8.12E+08 5.32E+08 5.51 7.08 4.58 5.42 
Chile 3.56E+10 7.82E+10 1.39E+11 8.42E+10 66.53 67.92 71.25 67.92 
China 3.66E+11 1.51E+12 3.59E+12 1.82E+12 92.80 97.92 98.75 98.75 
Colombia 2.47E+10 4.54E+10 1.00E+11 5.68E+10 64.83 61.25 62.08 61.25 
Comoros 6.38E+07 1.21E+08 2.73E+08 1.53E+08 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 
Congo 2.49E+09 6.36E+09 1.37E+10 7.52E+09 22.46 24.58 27.08 27.92 
Costa Rica 1.05E+10 1.78E+10 2.61E+10 1.81E+10 50.42 46.25 43.75 47.08 
Cote d’Ivoire 7.05E+09 1.29E+10 2.12E+10 1.37E+10 41.95 38.75 38.75 38.75 
Croatia 1.26E+10 2.90E+10 3.39E+10 2.52E+10 52.12 52.08 49.58 50.42 
Cuba 5.72E+09 1.11E+10 1.75E+10 1.15E+10 36.02 35.42 33.75 35.42 
Cyprus 4.89E+09 7.87E+09 9.77E+09 7.51E+09 34.32 29.58 20.42 27.08 
Denmark 9.62E+10 1.63E+11 1.95E+11 1.51E+11 80.93 75.42 74.58 75.42 
Djibouti 2.16E+08 3.84E+08 7.51E+08 4.50E+08 2.97 4.58 3.75 3.75 
Dominican Republic 1.21E+10 1.70E+10 2.47E+10 1.80E+10 51.27 45.42 40.42 46.25 
DR Congo 2.05E+09 4.99E+09 1.14E+10 6.15E+09 17.37 20.42 25.42 21.25 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Ecuador 9.07E+09 2.16E+10 4.40E+10 2.49E+10 47.88 49.58 51.25 49.58 
Egypt 1.80E+10 3.92E+10 8.70E+10 4.81E+10 58.90 57.92 60.42 59.58 
El Salvador 6.42E+09 1.08E+10 1.47E+10 1.06E+10 40.25 34.58 28.75 33.75 
Equatorial Guinea 1.09E+09 8.94E+09 1.72E+10 9.07E+09 11.44 31.25 32.08 29.58 
Eritrea 5.41E+08 5.23E+08 1.25E+09 7.72E+08 6.36 5.42 6.25 6.25 
Estonia 7.19E+09 1.92E+10 2.97E+10 1.87E+10 42.80 47.08 47.08 47.92 
Fiji 1.49E+09 2.28E+09 3.28E+09 2.35E+09 16.53 13.75 10.42 12.08 
Finland 7.47E+10 1.31E+11 1.43E+11 1.16E+11 76.69 74.58 72.08 73.75 
France 6.24E+11 9.86E+11 1.19E+12 9.34E+11 97.03 96.25 96.25 96.25 
Gabon 3.60E+09 6.74E+09 1.17E+10 7.34E+09 28.39 26.25 26.25 25.42 
Gambia 2.24E+08 2.56E+08 4.47E+08 3.09E+08 3.81 2.92 2.08 2.08 
Germany 1.01E+12 1.84E+12 2.48E+12 1.78E+12 98.73 98.75 97.92 97.92 
Ghana 4.35E+09 9.01E+09 2.51E+10 1.28E+10 30.93 32.08 42.08 37.92 
Greece 4.11E+10 7.79E+10 9.44E+10 7.11E+10 69.07 67.08 61.25 65.42 
Guatemala 6.71E+09 1.65E+10 2.57E+10 1.63E+10 41.10 44.58 42.92 43.75 
Guinea 1.32E+09 1.85E+09 3.55E+09 2.24E+09 14.83 10.42 12.08 10.42 
Guinea-Bissau 1.21E+08 2.00E+08 3.77E+08 2.33E+08 1.27 2.08 1.25 1.25 
Guyana 1.07E+09 1.44E+09 2.77E+09 1.76E+09 10.59 8.75 9.58 8.75 
Haiti 1.07E+09 1.96E+09 4.00E+09 2.34E+09 9.75 11.25 12.92 11.25 
Honduras 5.75E+09 1.18E+10 1.76E+10 1.17E+10 37.71 37.92 34.58 36.25 
India 7.99E+10 2.65E+11 6.83E+11 3.42E+11 77.54 86.25 88.75 86.25 
Indonesia 9.44E+10 1.65E+11 3.27E+11 1.95E+11 80.08 76.25 78.75 77.92 
Iran 3.58E+10 1.00E+11 1.47E+11 9.42E+10 67.37 72.08 72.92 71.25 
Iraq 1.56E+10 4.79E+10 1.19E+11 6.09E+10 57.20 62.92 66.25 62.08 
Ireland 1.05E+11 1.76E+11 1.88E+11 1.56E+11 81.78 77.92 73.75 76.25 
Israel 5.70E+10 9.19E+10 1.30E+11 9.31E+10 70.76 70.42 67.08 70.42 
Italy 4.62E+11 7.92E+11 9.57E+11 7.37E+11 95.34 93.75 92.92 93.75 
Jamaica 4.40E+09 6.96E+09 7.20E+09 6.18E+09 31.78 27.92 17.08 22.08 
Japan 7.58E+11 1.12E+12 1.47E+12 1.12E+12 97.88 97.08 97.08 97.08 
Jordan 6.05E+09 1.49E+10 2.68E+10 1.59E+10 39.41 41.25 45.42 42.92 
Kenya 5.00E+09 9.70E+09 2.05E+10 1.17E+10 35.17 32.92 37.92 37.08 
Kuwait 2.21E+10 6.11E+10 1.15E+11 6.60E+10 61.44 63.75 63.75 64.58 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Latvia 4.50E+09 1.53E+10 2.72E+10 1.57E+10 32.63 42.08 46.25 42.08 
Lebanon 7.76E+09 1.29E+10 2.48E+10 1.51E+10 43.64 39.58 41.25 41.25 
Liberia 9.70E+08 5.56E+08 1.52E+09 1.01E+09 8.05 7.92 7.08 7.92 
Libya 1.47E+10 3.84E+10 5.14E+10 3.48E+10 56.36 57.08 52.08 53.75 
Lithuania 8.76E+09 2.99E+10 5.54E+10 3.14E+10 47.03 52.92 52.92 52.08 
Madagascar 1.43E+09 2.89E+09 4.65E+09 2.99E+09 15.68 14.58 15.42 15.42 
Malaysia 1.56E+11 2.60E+11 3.91E+11 2.69E+11 86.86 85.42 81.25 84.58 
Mauritania 8.40E+08 2.03E+09 4.50E+09 2.45E+09 7.20 12.08 14.58 13.75 
Mauritius 3.74E+09 5.34E+09 7.49E+09 5.53E+09 29.24 22.08 17.92 19.58 
Mexico 2.53E+11 4.56E+11 7.01E+11 4.70E+11 90.25 89.58 89.58 90.42 
Montenegro  3.41E+09 2.76E+09 2.96E+09  15.42 8.75 14.58 
Morocco 1.75E+10 3.56E+10 6.14E+10 3.82E+10 58.05 55.42 54.58 55.42 
Mozambique 1.22E+09 4.32E+09 1.08E+10 5.44E+09 13.98 17.92 22.92 18.75 
Myanmar 3.36E+09 6.83E+09 2.00E+10 1.01E+10 26.69 27.08 37.08 31.25 
Namibia 2.93E+09 4.87E+09 1.11E+10 6.29E+09 24.15 19.58 24.58 22.92 
Netherlands 4.16E+11 8.02E+11 1.16E+12 7.94E+11 93.64 94.58 95.42 94.58 
New Zealand 2.73E+10 4.68E+10 7.10E+10 4.84E+10 65.68 62.08 57.92 60.42 
Nicaragua 2.13E+09 4.72E+09 1.03E+10 5.70E+09 18.22 18.75 21.25 20.42 
Nigeria 2.41E+10 7.25E+10 1.38E+11 7.83E+10 63.98 65.42 70.42 66.25 
North Korea 2.23E+09 4.05E+09 7.92E+09 4.73E+09 19.92 17.08 18.75 17.08 
Norway 8.41E+10 1.65E+11 2.22E+11 1.57E+11 78.39 77.08 76.25 77.08 
Oman 1.32E+10 3.14E+10 6.93E+10 3.79E+10 53.81 53.75 57.08 54.58 
Pakistan 1.96E+10 3.98E+10 6.49E+10 4.14E+10 60.59 58.75 56.25 57.92 
Panama 3.84E+09 1.36E+10 3.34E+10 1.70E+10 30.08 40.42 48.75 44.58 
Papua New Guinea 3.49E+09 5.55E+09 1.10E+10 6.69E+09 27.54 22.92 23.75 24.58 
Peru 1.40E+10 3.34E+10 7.56E+10 4.10E+10 54.66 54.58 58.75 56.25 
Philippines 6.23E+10 9.30E+10 1.15E+11 9.01E+10 73.31 71.25 64.58 69.58 
Poland 7.10E+10 2.14E+11 3.80E+11 2.22E+11 75.00 80.42 80.42 79.58 
Portugal 6.14E+10 1.06E+11 1.31E+11 9.95E+10 72.46 72.92 68.75 72.08 
Qatar 1.01E+10 4.36E+10 1.31E+11 6.16E+10 48.73 60.42 67.92 62.92 
Russia 1.45E+11 4.06E+11 7.22E+11 4.24E+11 85.17 88.75 90.42 88.75 
Saudi Arabia 8.73E+10 2.41E+11 4.46E+11 2.58E+11 79.24 83.75 83.75 82.92 
  
Country 1995-2001 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 2002-2008 2009-2015 1995-2015 
Senegal 2.47E+09 5.23E+09 8.25E+09 5.32E+09 21.61 21.25 19.58 17.92 
Sierra Leone 1.58E+08 5.28E+08 2.22E+09 9.67E+08 2.12 6.25 7.92 7.08 
Singapore 1.92E+11 3.55E+11 6.52E+11 4.00E+11 87.71 87.08 87.92 87.92 
Slovenia 1.85E+10 4.31E+10 6.36E+10 4.17E+10 59.75 59.58 55.42 58.75 
Solomon Islands 2.47E+08 3.05E+08 8.26E+08 4.59E+08 4.66 3.75 5.42 4.58 
Somalia         
South Africa 5.83E+10 1.18E+11 2.01E+11 1.26E+11 71.61 73.75 75.42 74.58 
South Korea 2.76E+11 5.62E+11 9.80E+11 6.06E+11 91.10 91.25 93.75 91.25 
Spain 2.41E+11 4.95E+11 6.22E+11 4.53E+11 89.41 90.42 87.08 89.58 
Sri Lanka 1.04E+10 1.57E+10 2.67E+10 1.76E+10 49.58 42.92 44.58 45.42 
Sudan 2.55E+09 1.17E+10 1.62E+10 1.01E+10 23.31 37.08 31.25 32.08 
Sweden 1.50E+11 2.50E+11 3.13E+11 2.38E+11 86.02 84.58 77.92 80.42 
Syria 8.30E+09 1.99E+10 1.72E+10 1.51E+10 45.34 48.75 32.92 40.42 
Taiwan 2.36E+11 3.78E+11 5.42E+11 3.85E+11 88.56 87.92 86.25 87.08 
Tanzania 2.23E+09 5.65E+09 1.46E+10 7.50E+09 19.07 23.75 27.92 26.25 
Thailand 1.20E+11 2.31E+11 4.20E+11 2.57E+11 83.47 82.08 82.08 82.08 
Timor  1.65E+08 6.08E+08 4.04E+08  1.25 2.92 2.92 
Togo 9.97E+08 1.65E+09 3.37E+09 2.01E+09 8.90 9.58 11.25 9.58 
Trinidad and Tobago 5.80E+09 1.62E+10 2.25E+10 1.48E+10 38.56 43.75 39.58 39.58 
Tunisia 1.42E+10 2.66E+10 3.90E+10 2.66E+10 55.51 51.25 50.42 51.25 
Turkey 7.05E+10 1.99E+11 3.52E+11 2.07E+11 74.15 78.75 79.58 78.75 
United Arab Emirates 7.14E+10 2.22E+11 5.06E+11 2.67E+11 75.85 81.25 85.42 83.75 
United Kingdom 5.83E+11 9.07E+11 1.10E+12 8.64E+11 96.19 95.42 94.58 95.42 
United States 1.67E+12 2.64E+12 3.61E+12 2.64E+12 99.58 99.58 99.58 99.58 
Uruguay 5.74E+09 7.93E+09 1.79E+10 1.05E+10 36.86 30.42 36.25 32.92 
Venezuela 3.80E+10 8.19E+10 1.17E+11 7.90E+10 68.22 69.58 65.42 67.08 
Vietnam 2.26E+10 7.84E+10 2.29E+11 1.10E+11 62.29 68.75 77.08 72.92 
Yemen 4.73E+09 1.12E+10 1.78E+10 1.12E+10 33.47 36.25 35.42 34.58 
Source: WTO “Time Series on International Trade” 
 
